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STATUS RECONSIDERED
Gary Lawson*
Robert D. Sloane**
Abstract: International and constitutional law arguably collide in the legal arrangement between the United States and Puerto Rico. As a matter
of international law, it is unclear that this arrangement conforms to customary international and treaty obligations. As a matter of national law, it
is unclear that the Constitution permits an arrangement between Puerto
Rico and the United States—short of separation (independence as a
State) or integration (admission to the Union as a state)—that could conform to these international obligations. In particular, the Appointments
Clause and the Constitution’s voting provisions may well be in tension
with contemporary international law relative to Puerto Rico. In this Article, we seek, partly through an internal dialogue, to clarify several unacknowledged or underappreciated legal tensions in the U.S.-Puerto Rico
relationship and to explore ways to resolve them. One of us adopts a
plain-meaning, originalist view of the Constitution, which underscores the
arguable constitutional defects in the current U.S.-Puerto Rico relationship. The other does not embrace originalism and therefore would not
exclude resolution of the tensions between international and constitutional law by means of constitutional interpretation. We agree, however,
that those tensions can no longer be neglected in a State committed to
the rule of law and that several of the most troubling can be resolved—
with a modest amount of political will and creativity—in a manner that effectively elides the oft-intractable debates in modern constitutional theory: substantive, even if not formal, international legal compliance can be
uncontroversially established. Above all, we seek to reframe and facilitate
a long-overdue discussion about how to reconcile U.S. international obligations toward Puerto Rico with the Constitution.

* Professor of Law and Abraham & Lillian Benton Scholar, Boston University School
of Law.
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I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it
would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our
councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article [of the Constitution], I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion.
—Gouverneur Morris1

Introduction
International law and U.S. constitutional law collide in the present
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico, and it is unclear that both can survive the collision. For where, as in Puerto Rico,
decolonization creates a State2 freely associated with the United States,
the Constitution’s Appointments Clause3 and its provisions on the franchise4 may well be in tension with international law. Postwar decolonization norms and the principle of the self-determination of peoples
require that Puerto Ricans enjoy the right to “external” self-determination5—that is, the right to choose political independence, integration
with an existing state, or free association in a referendum expressing
the popular will—and, in theory, Puerto Ricans exercised this right under international law in 1952 by choosing a particular arrangement of
free association with the United States.6 But there are serious questions
1 Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston (Dec. 4, 1803), in 3 The Life
of Gouverneur Morris, with Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers 192 ( Jared Sparks ed., 1832). Morris was referring to the Territories Clause,
which he drafted. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
2 For clarity, throughout this article, we capitalize “State” where it refers to a sovereign
country and use the lowercase “state” to refer to one of the several states of the Union.
3 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States . . . : but the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).
4 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art II, § 1, cl. 2; id. amend. XVII.
5 The concept of self-determination has come to describe several distinct concepts,
which prove, at times, to be in tension with one another. See Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 Mich. J. Int’l L. 733, 733 (1995)
(reviewing Yves Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and
National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy (1994)) (describing self-determination as “a concept increasingly at war with itself”). Within the sometimes fuzzy conceptual framework of self-determination, considerable attention has focused on and controversy been generated by two questions: first, which groups qualify as
“peoples” entitled to self-determination; and second, what does the (collective) right of a
people to “freely determine” its “political status” guarantee? See generally id. We largely elide
the first question here and address only narrow aspects of the second in connection with
the status of U.S. territorial possessions.
6 See Proclamation by the Governor of Puerto Rico, Establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, July 25, 1952, reprinted in Documents on the Constitutional
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whether the Constitution’s structural provisions permit this arrangement. Simply put, the Constitution may constrain the U.S. ability to decolonize Puerto Rico as the people of Puerto Rico chose in accordance
with the requirements of international law.
In this Article, a collaborative effort by scholars focused on constitutional and international law, respectively, we seek to clarify this formerly unacknowledged tension and explore potential means by which
it might be resolved. One of us adopts a formalist, plain-meaning
originalist view of the Constitution, which throws into sharp relief the
arguable constitutional defects in the present U.S.-Puerto Rican relationship established more than fifty years ago. The other does not embrace originalism and therefore would not be as quick to exclude a potential resolution of the apparent tensions between international and
constitutional law by means of constitutional interpretation.
Notwithstanding these stark methodological differences, however,
the authors agree that the tensions can no longer be neglected in a
State committed to the rule of law. The profound issues raised by the
domestic and international legal status of Puerto Rico need to be faced
and resolved. The authors also agree (and aspire to be living proof)
that several of the most troubling of the arguable obstacles to constitutional self-governance for Puerto Rico as a State freely associated with
the United States can be resolved—with a modest amount of political
will and creativity—in a manner that, in effect, elides the oft-intractable
debates that afflict modern constitutional theory.
The tensions we analyze arise in part because the associated state is
a comparatively new form of polity in the international arena— unknown both to the framing generation and to classical, prewar international law. It emerged in the postwar era of decolonization.7 Yet the
U.N. Charter, a binding treaty under the Supremacy Clause,8 obliges
the United States, like all metropolitan member States—that is, States
History of Puerto Rico 198 (Office of the Commw. of P.R. in D.C. ed., 2d ed. 1964)
[hereinafter Proclamation of July 25, 1952]. We do not express or intend to imply any view
about the legitimacy of this process as a matter of normative or political theory. Cf. Joel
Colón-Rios & Martin Hevia, The (Un)Rule of Law in Puerto Rico: A Republican Approach
1 & n.2 (Jan. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1088883) (distinguishing formal consent in the Puerto Rican referendum from its “dubious
democratic legitimacy”).
7 See infra notes 47–56 and accompanying text.
8 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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“which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government”—to promote the progressive development of appropriate forms
of self-government in those territories.9 When the Charter entered into
force in 1945, the United States held several territories subject to the
Charter, most of which it promptly, effectively—and constitutionally—
decolonized.10 Puerto Rico’s decolonization, however, proves far more
problematic.
In 1950, Congress enacted Public Law 600, a somewhat oblique
statute “in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may
organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.”11 Puerto Rico thereupon drafted a constitution, which Congress
approved in 1952, subject to three compulsory amendments.12 Puerto
Rico accepted these, and its constitution entered into force the same
year.13 Based on these events, the United States represented to the
United Nations that Puerto Rico, though formerly “a territory subject
to the full authority of the Congress,” had achieved a new status pursuant to “a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may be changed
only by common consent.”14 Accordingly, the United Nations removed
Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-governing territories—and hence
Puerto Rico apparently acquired a new status in 1952, both internationally and within the framework of U.S. constitutional law.15
Yet these events raise rather than answer the real questions about
Puerto Rico’s present status under both international and domestic law.
In short, (1) as a matter of international law, it is unclear that the current
relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico in fact conforms to customary international law on decolonization, human rights,

9 See U.N. Charter art. 73.
10 See infra notes 100–106 and accompanying text.
11 See Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, § 1, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (emphasis added).
For the sake of brevity, we will at times refer to the “compact” between the United States
and Puerto Rico as a convenient shorthand for Public Law 600’s self-description as being
adopted “in the nature of a compact.” Two years later, Congress referred to the arrangement with Puerto Rico “as a compact.” Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, pmbl., 66
Stat. 327, 327 (emphasis added). See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
12 See Act of July 3, 1952, 66 Stat. at 327–28.
13 Proclamation of July 25, 1952, supra note 6, at 198.
14 Frances P. Bolton, U.S. Rep. to the Gen. Assembly, Nov. 3 Statement by Mrs. Bolton
in Committee IV (Trusteeship) (Nov. 3, 1953), in 29 Dep’t St. Bull. 802, 804 (Dec. 1953)
[hereinafter Nov. 3 Statement by Frances Bolton].
15 See G.A. Res. 748, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (Nov. 27,
1953).
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and self-determination, as well as explicit U.S. treaty obligations;16 and
(2) as a matter of domestic law, it is unclear that the Constitution permits
an arrangement between Puerto Rico and the United States—short of
separation (independence) or integration (statehood)—that could conform to these norms of contemporary international law. Puerto Rico
refers to itself as an estado libre asociado (“associated free state”),17 but although international law now recognizes a variety of associated-state relationships as lawful, it is not clear that the Constitution does.
Indeed, since the adoption of Puerto Rico’s constitution in 1952,
there have been serious doubts in some quarters whether Puerto Rico
genuinely enjoys the kind and quality of self-governance that satisfies
international law. Many argue, as did former Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh, that the “Constitution knows only the mutually exclusive
categories of ‘State’ and ‘Territory.’”18 In fact, it appears to be the uniform opinion of all three branches of the federal government that,
whatever Puerto Rico’s international legal status, the putative “Commonwealth” remains, domestically, just another territory subject to Congress’s plenary power under the Territories Clause.19 If so, the United
States—or so many have assumed—is in violation of its international
legal obligations vis-à-vis Puerto Rico.
We argue that the issues turn out to be both more and less problematic than this account suggests. First, even if the United States retains plenary authority over Puerto Rico as a matter of its internal law,
that does not necessarily establish that, in international law, Puerto
Rico fails to qualify as an adequately self-governing, autonomous entity
that conforms to the criteria for the particular arrangement of associated statehood for which Puerto Rico bargained in 1952.20 International law generally views internal laws as facts to be appraised contextually to determine substantive compliance with international obligations.21 Given Congress’s evident disinclination to intervene in Puerto
Rico’s local affairs and the federal government’s solicitude for Puerto
Rico, a contextual analysis suggests that Puerto Rico presently enjoys
enough de facto autonomy to satisfy U.S. international obligations to16 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 1, 25, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
17 See Resolution 22, Approved by the Constitutional Convention of Puerto Rico, Feb.
4, 1952, reprinted in Constitutional Documents, supra note 6, at 164.
18 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution,
the State, and American Citizenship 89–90 (2002).
19 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
20 See G.A. Res. 748, supra note 15, at 25–26.
21 See infra notes 192–197 and accompanying text.
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ward Puerto Rico arising out of the bilateral compact—regardless of
the right answers to perennial constitutional debates about the mysterious Public Law 600 “adopted in the nature of a compact,” that authorized the Commonwealth’s establishment.22
Yet this conclusion alone does not diffuse several oft-overlooked
tensions generated by the interaction of, on the one hand, a legal system based on a late-eighteenth-century constitution and, on the other,
contemporary international law, which differs profoundly from the
classical international legal system known to the framing generation.
First, the Appointments Clause requires that all principal officers
of the United States be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, although inferior officers may be appointed, if
Congress so provides, by the President alone, the courts, or the heads
of departments.23 But all “Officers of the United States,” as defined by
the Supreme Court in 1976 in Buckley v. Valeo, must be appointed by
one of these mechanisms.24 High officials in Puerto Rico’s government,
including but not necessarily limited to its governor, qualify as officers
of the United States under Buckley. Yet at present, Puerto Ricans nonetheless directly elect them in prima facie violation of the Appointments
Clause.25 These election procedures constitute vital components of
Puerto Rican self-governance; without them, the United States would
almost surely be in violation of international law. But they are also arguably (and one of us so argues) unlawful as a matter of domestic U.S.
law.26
Second, international law requires that associated states enjoy a
genuine, popular voice in changes to their political status, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which
the United States has ratified, requires that “[e]very citizen shall have
the right . . . : (a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives; [and] (b) [t]o vote and to be
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage . . . .”27 Puerto Rico, however, merely sends a non-voting
observer, or Resident Commissioner, to Congress, where he exercises
22 See Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, § 1, 64 Stat. 319, 319.
23 See. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24 See 424 U.S. 1, 125–26 (1976) (per curiam) (defining the term “Officers of the
United States” as used in Article II as “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”).
25 See P.R. Const. art. IV, § 1.
26 See infra notes 242–319 and accompanying text.
27 See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25 (emphasis added).
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whatever persuasive political power he can muster—just as can any
other sovereign or private interest affected by U.S. policy.28 And although Puerto Ricans nominally (by statute and, arguably, the Constitution itself) qualify as full citizens, so long as they reside in Puerto Rico
rather than one of the states of the Union, they may not vote in federal
elections because the Constitution vests that power in electors appointed by the state legislatures for presidential elections29 and the citizens of the several states for congressional elections.30 This voting arrangement is arguably (and one of us so argues) necessary as a matter
of domestic U.S. law, but it is also arguably, if not clearly, unlawful as a
matter of international law.
In Part I of this Article, we seek to ascertain the customary international law that governs the novel postwar entity known as an associated
state, one of the three self-determination options available to formerly
colonized peoples.31 The neglect of the law on associated states in the
literature is regrettable in itself—for, often, associated states offer an
overlooked but plausible political resolution to some of today’s seemingly intractable conflicts between, on the one hand, minorities or
peoples with separatist aspirations, and on the other, established States
or those dominated by irredentist elites. But an appreciation of the international legal requirements for associated states also proves indispensable to an accurate appraisal of U.S. compliance with its obligations toward Puerto Rico in the framework of its constitutional legal
order.
In Part II, we analyze, from the perspective of, respectively, international and constitutional law, the U.S. legal relationship with Puerto
Rico.32 We focus in part on the complex interpretation and meaning of
Public Law 600.33 But our paramount goal is to identify the extent to
which U.S. legal practice, in substance if not necessarily form, conforms
to international norms governing decolonization. We argue, contrary
to the predominant view, that those norms prove to be flexible enough
to make a forceful, though admittedly non-conclusive, case for substantial U.S. compliance with its international obligations toward Puerto
28 See 48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006) (stating that Puerto Rico “shall choose a Resident Commissioner to the United States at each general election” for a term of four years).
29 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
30Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
31 See infra notes 47–88 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 89–232 and accompanying text. To be clear, we reiterate that we do
not purport to address any aspect of this relationship from the standpoint of normative or
political theory.
33 See generally Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319.
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Rico.34 Consequently, the more difficult question is whether substantial
compliance is compliance enough—and, if not, whether the Constitution can accommodate a modified arrangement that closes the legal
gap.
In Part III, we therefore analyze the extent to which the Constitution may present obstacles to the instantiation of associated statehood
for Puerto Rico.35 We conduct this inquiry in part by means of a dialogue. Professor Lawson argues that the Constitution forbids formal
mechanisms to enable Puerto Rican self-governance.36 Indeed, in his
view, the Constitution prohibits—except, perhaps, by means of an Article II treaty arrangement between previously sovereign States—formal
self-governing institutions that would satisfy U.S. international obligations, not only toward Puerto Rico, but toward any other territory of
the United States, such as the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands (“CNMI”). He concludes that the present Puerto Rican government, and the legal framework purporting to authorize it, is unconstitutional.37 Professor Sloane, in contrast, sees the Constitution— especially in the realm of foreign affairs and international law—more in the
spirit of Justice Holmes’s well-known dictum that “when we are dealing
with words that also are a constituent act, like the Constitution of the
United States, we must realize that they have called into life a being the
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the
most gifted of its begetters” and, accordingly, that “[w]e must consider
what this country has become in deciding” whether the Constitution
can legally accommodate a novel form of international polity unknown
to the framing generation.38 He is therefore more sanguine about the
ability of the Constitution to evolve to meet the requirements of contemporary international law.39
The authors agree, however, that creative mechanisms to ensure
substantive, even if not formal, international legal compliance can be
established in a fashion that elides perennially debated issues of constitutional law and theory. We strive to offer concrete proposals to resolve
the arguable tensions between, on the one hand, an eighteenthcentury Constitution, enacted in an era that accepted colonialism as a
legitimate part of the international legal order, and on the other, con34 See infra notes 185–232 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 233–373 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 241–305 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 241–305 and accompanying text.
38 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920).
39 See infra notes 306–319 and accompanying text.
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temporary international law, which clearly prohibits it. With respect to
the Appointments Clause, we argue that Congress and the President
can solve this problem, at no obvious political cost, by giving pro forma
appointments to the winning parties in Puerto Rican elections.40 We
then consider whether constitutional mechanisms exist by which the
United States can vest Puerto Ricans with adequate voting rights and
democratic participation in the federal government, which proves to be
a more complex problem to solve.41
Two potential mechanisms exist to remedy the absence of the
franchise for Puerto Rican citizens of the United States. First, the compact with Puerto Rico might be construed to require bilateral consent
to any fundamental changes in the relationship between the United
States and Puerto Rico or to the scope of the latter’s autonomy.42 Yet
the weight of authority suggests that neither Congress nor the executive
branch understood Public Law 600 as an irrevocable delegation of
Congress’s otherwise plenary authority under the Territories Clause,
even assuming that such a statute would be constitutional.43 Second, if
the federal government therefore perforce retains plenary power over
Puerto Rico as a constitutional matter, Puerto Ricans could be given a
voice in that government by vesting them with the franchise. This latter
40 See infra notes 320–324 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 325–373 and accompanying text. This issue has been litigated repeatedly in recent years. See, e.g., Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 146–47,
150–51 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (dismissing, for the third time, a suit by Gregorio Igartúa
alleging that as a Puerto Rican citizen of the United States, he enjoys the right to vote in
presidential elections under the ICCPR and customary international law); Romeu v.
Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that as a U.S. citizen
residing in Puerto Rico who formerly resided and voted in New York, he had the right to
vote in presidential elections by absentee ballot from New York).
42 That is how Puerto Rico, and some U.S. politicians, understood the compact in
1953. See Letter from Luis Muñoz Marin, Governor of Puerto Rico, to the President of the
United States ( Jan. 17, 1953), in 28 Dep’t St. Bull. 588, 589 (Apr. 1953) [hereinafter
Letter from Luis Muñoz Marin] (“Our status and the terms of our association with the
United States cannot be changed without our full consent.”); see also Frances P. Bolton,
U.S. Rep. to the Gen. Assembly, Oct. 30 Statement by Mrs. Bolton in Committee IV (Trusteeship), in 29 Dep’t St. Bull. 797, 798 (Dec. 1953) [hereinafter Oct. 30 Statement by
Frances Bolton] (asserting that the new Puerto Rican constitution created an arrangement
with the United States that “may not be amended or abrogated unilaterally”). Several lower
federal court decisions have also implied this view. See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 758
F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Under the compact between the people of Puerto Rico and
the United States, Congress cannot amend the Puerto Rico Constitution unilaterally, and
the government of Puerto Rico is no longer a federal government agency exercising delegated power.”).
43 See Arnold H. Leibowitz, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of
United States Territorial Relations 165–69 (1989) (reviewing the legislative history
of Public Law 600).
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option, however, may well be unconstitutional absent a constitutional
amendment.44 One of us would argue that it is; the other regards the
Constitution as capable of evolving to meet the new demands of international law in this regard without doing violence to the constitutional
text.45 We consider several potential solutions in that vein.46
We differ, sometimes sharply, on a number of constitutional issues
relevant to this analysis, largely because of more basic disagreements
about constitutional methodology. But we share a belief in the capacity
and need for valid constitutional solutions to the uncertain legal status
of Puerto Rico, which has subsisted in a legal limbo for more than fifty
years now. Our goals are to expose heretofore unrecognized legal problems; to clarify their scope; to explore them by means of internal dialogue; and, finally, to suggest creative mechanisms that may, assuming
political will, ensure substantive, even if not necessarily formal, compliance with contemporary international law—while striving to elide the
intractable constitutional issues. Because the present associated statehood relationship arguably violates both international and constitutional law, the complex issues of Puerto Rico’s legal status, and viable
options for its future in the twenty-first century, compel attention.
Above all, we therefore seek to facilitate a long-overdue discussion
about how, concretely, to reconcile U.S. international obligations toward Puerto Rico with the Constitution.
I. Self-Determination and Associated Statehood in
Contemporary International Law
A. The Evolution of the Right to Self-Determination
Self-determination, initially associated with Wilsonian idealism and
the Versailles peace process that redrew the map of Europe in the wake
of the First World War,47 emerged in the interwar period not as a posi44 See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in the Territories, in
Foreign in a Domestic Sense 182, 196–98 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall
eds., 2001) (discussing the restriction of national representation to the states only, and
questioning “[t]he degree to which territorial and commonwealth statuses would permit a
group that views itself as a territorial people to achieve self-determination within the U.S.
constitutional system”).
45 See infra notes 325–373 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 371–373 and accompanying text.
47 The historical development of the right of peoples to self-determination as a concept of international law has been analyzed in detail elsewhere. See generally Frederic L.
Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 304
(1994); Diane F. Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist
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tive right but as a political principle: “that the new borders of Europe
would, to the extent possible, be drawn along national lines.”48 Before
the U.N. Charter regime and the advent of international human rights
law, self-determination emphatically did not mean that the imperial
powers of Europe would permit the peoples of colonized territories to
determine their own political destinies.49
Following World War II, however, in part because Germany and
others abused the idea of self-determination and minority-rights regimes as pretexts for aggression,50 international law fundamentally
reconceptualized self-determination such that it evolved into a clear
international right to be free from colonial domination.51 Article 1 of
the U.N. Charter cites one of its four principal purposes as being “[t]o
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples,” and Article 73
sets out the obligation of metropolitan states progressively to promote
self-government among formerly subjugated peoples and colonies.52
A series of General Assembly resolutions shortly followed, which,
in effect, established the customary framework for decolonization. In
1950, the General Assembly requested a study of “ways and means
which would ensure the right of peoples and nations to self-determination.”53 Ten years later, it adopted Resolution 1514, which condemned
colonialism, reaffirmed the right of self-determination, and called on
imperial states promptly to take steps to transfer political power to the
Claims, 23 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (1998). We review it briefly here only to supply the essential
context in which the tensions between international and constitutional law that we explore
in this study arise.
48 Orentlicher, supra note 47, at 32–33. The Aaland Islands affair is frequently cited as
evidence that international law did not, in the aftermath of World War I, recognize selfdetermination as a right, particularly relative to secessionist claims. See, e.g., Thomas M.
Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 Am. J. Int’l L. 46, 54 (1992); Kirgis,
supra note 47, at 304. An international commission created by the new League of Nations
denied self-determination to the Islands whose population sought to secede from Finland.
See Franck, supra, at 54; see also The Aaland Islands Question: Report Submitted to the Council of
the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7.21/68/106,
at 27–28 (1921); Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the
League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the
Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations Doc. 69.20/4/238 (1920).
49 See Orentlicher, supra note 47, at 39.
50 See Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship 2 (1996) (noting that “Nazi
Germany justified its invasion of Poland and Czechoslovakia on the grounds that these
countries were violating the treaty rights of ethnic Germans on their soil”).
51 Kirgis, supra note 47, at 305–08; Orentlicher, supra note 47, at 40–41.
52 U.N. Charter arts. 1, 73.
53 G.A. Res. 421, ¶ 6, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Dec. 1,
1950).
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peoples of formerly subjugated territories “in accordance with their
freely expressed will and desire.”54 The Assembly recognized, however,
that despite the historic injustices of colonialism, not all peoples would
necessarily want independence.55 Nor would it necessarily be in their
best interest. For economic, cultural, national security, and other reasons, some former colonies would prefer to retain political ties to their
erstwhile imperial States. Resolution 1541, also adopted in 1960, therefore declared that peoples entitled to self-determination could exercise
that right by choosing among three political arrangements, each of
which would qualify as “a full measure of self-government”: “(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an
independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State.”56
Although the meaning of the right to self-determination remains
controversial in the context of disaffected minorities and secessionist
claims,57 Resolution 1541 has long been accepted as the authoritative
interpretation of this right in the decolonization context. For example,
in 1975, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) issued its advisory
opinion in Western Sahara, which affirmed this understanding of the
right of self-determination in the context of decolonization.58 After recalling its 1970 determination in Namibia that “‘the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories,
as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle
of self-determination applicable to all of them,’”59 the court concluded
that “[t]he validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the
need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples,”60 required it
to assume that the people of Western Sahara enjoyed a right “to deter54 G.A. Res. 1514, at 66–67, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(Dec. 14, 1960).
55 Cf. Masahiro Igarashi, Associated Statehood in International Law 147–48
(2002) (noting that in the General Assembly debates culminating in the historic Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States, G.A. Res 2625 (XXV), adopted in 1970, some states “argued that Non-SelfGoverning Territories differed greatly, both in natural resources and wealth, size and population and also in the aspiration of the peoples concerned”).
56 G.A. Res. 1541, at 29, Annex, Principle VI, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (Dec. 15, 1960).
57 See, e.g., Badinter Comm’n, Opinion No. 1, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Commission, 31 I.L.M. 1494, 1495–97 (1992) (considering possible secessionist claims of
the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
58 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
59 Id. at 31 (quoting Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 31 ( June 21)).
60 Id. at 33.
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mine their future political status by their own freely expressed will.”61 At
the same time, the court reaffirmed that the realization of this right can
take diverse forms. International law, it said, “leaves the General Assembly a measure of discretion with respect to the forms and procedures by which that right is to be realized.”62 Those forms include, as
set out in Resolution 1541, independence, free association, and integration.63 Two decades later, in the East Timor case, the ICJ characterized the right to self-determination, as expounded in its earlier jurisprudence, as erga omnes.64
The process of decolonization peaked during the 1960s and 1970s
and wound down in the 1980s. After Palau’s establishment as an associated state in 1994,65 the Trusteeship Council suspended its operations,66 although it still exists and, despite more than a decade of inactivity, “can be convened on demand.”67 Yet several colonial or other ter61 Id. at 36; see also Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 114 (Can.)
(“The existence of the right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized
in international conventions that the principle has acquired a status beyond ‘convention’
and is considered a general principle of international law.”); Martti Koskenniemi, National
Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and Practice, 43 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 241, 242
(1994) (noting that “by the end of the 1970s most textbooks addressed self-determination
in terms of a legal principle or a right of positive international law”).
62 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 36.
63 Id. at 32. The option of associated statehood has, regrettably, often been neglected.
It should not be. Apart from its utility in the decolonization context, it offers a potentially
effective compromise in the all-too-common circumstance, as prevalent today as in the
past, in which a disaffected national minority demands independence, but neither the
political majority nor the international community as a whole will accept that demand for
fear of an inexorable slide toward the destabilization and progressive fragmentation of
nation-states. See Igarashi, supra note 55, at 5. An international right to secede may arise
in cases of serious political repression or human rights violations. See Reference re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶¶ 132–34, 138 (Can.).
64 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102 ( June 30). The international phrase
“erga omnes” means literally “relative to everyone.” It first emerged in the ICJ’s decision in
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), in which the Court distinguished between
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By
their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
65 T.C. Res. 2199 (LXI), U.N. Doc. T/RES/2199 (May 25, 1994); see also S.C. Res. 956,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/956 (Nov. 10, 1994).
66 U.N. Dep’t of Pub. Info., Basic Facts About the United Nations 13 (2004).
67 Carolyn L. Willson, Changing the Charter: The United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-first
Century, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 115, 122 (1996). Self-determination “reemerged as a major issue
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ritories remain in the process of achieving self-determination, having
never completed—or been unable to complete—the progression contemplated by Resolution 1541.68 Because the modern concept of selfdetermination emerged as a genuine right of peoples in the decolonization era and is at its most robust in that context, the colonial origins
of these territories validate their continuing right to “external” selfdetermination: that is, the right to choose independence, associated
statehood, or integration according to the freely expressed wishes of
their peoples.
Furthermore, the right to self-determination in the decolonization
context does not necessarily terminate with the first act of collective
political expression. Eritrea, for example, originated as an Italian colony in the late nineteenth century; became an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 390A in
1950; reunified with Ethiopia in 1962; and declared its independence
and seceded to form an independent state in 1993.69 This suggests that
if the arrangement initially adopted by a former colony proves unsatisfactory, its people should, in at least some circumstances, have the right
to opt for a new status—be it independence, (a new form of) free association, or integration with an existing State. Associated states in parin the 1990s . . . because of the explosion of post-Cold War State successions,” and “[t]he
question therefore arose—or, more accurately, reemerged from its dormancy since the
interwar period—whether and, if so, under what conditions, the right to self-determination
requires that States offer greater autonomy or even independence to disaffected national,
ethnic, or other minorities.” Robert D. Sloane, The Policies of State Succession: Harmonizing
Self-Determination and Global Order in the Twenty-first Century, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1288,
1306 (2007) (reviewing Tai-Heng Cheng, State Succession and Commercial Obligations (2006)). A relatively accurate statement of current international law on the issue
appears in Reference re Secession of Quebec, in which the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the right to self-determination might permit Quebec to secede from Canada
unilaterally. [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). It concluded that, today, apart from the decolonization context, international law generally requires that self-determin-ation be fulfilled
internally, through the political channels available in democratic states and, if necessary,
by affording special protections to national minorities. Id. ¶ 126. Following academic terminology, it referred to this as “internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing
state.” Id. In contrast, an “external” right to self-determination—that is, the right of a people to choose independence, free association or integration in accordance with Resolution
1541—arises “only in the most extreme cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” Id. International law continues, however, to validate a robust, external right
to self-determination for the peoples of former or residual colonies—a right the Court
characterized as “undisputed.” Id. ¶ 132.
68 See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 56, at 29, Annex, Principle VI.
69 For an overview, see Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 Emory
Int’l L. Rev. 479, 482–88 (1994).
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ticular, as Resolution 1541 affirms, retain “the freedom to modify the
status of [their] territory through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.”70
B. Associated Statehood as a Vehicle for Self-Determination
What, then, is an associated state? Although the political concept
has antecedents in the protectorates of the colonial era, it emerged in
its modern formulation during the era of decolonization as an alternative to the polar options of independence and integration with an existing State.71 Some peoples, particularly those in small territories, although naturally keen to exercise their right to autonomy and selfgovernance, appreciated that their long-term economic, security, or
other interests would be better served through some form of continuing association with their erstwhile metropolitan States.72 Associated
statehood accommodated this desire by making an intermediate political status available. The concept of associated states in international law
came to embrace a broad spectrum of political arrangements between
two entities “characterized by recognition of the significant subordination of and delegations of competence by one of the parties (the associate) to the other (the principal) but maintenance of the continuing
international status of statehood of each component.”73
The legal evolution of associated statehood dates back to shortly
after the adoption of the U.N. Charter. In 1949, the General Assembly
began to establish guidelines to instantiate Article 73(e) of the Charter,
which obliges metropolitan States to transmit certain information with
respect to “territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.”74 With Resolution 334, it invited a subcommittee to “examine the factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether any territory is or is not a territory whose people have
not yet attained a full measure of self-government.”75 This resulting list,
adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 567 of 1952, included a
separate enumeration of factors “indicative of the free association . . . of
70 See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 56, at 29, Annex, Principle VII(a).
71 W. Michael Reisman, Puerto Rico and the International Process: New Roles
in Association 9–13 (1975); see also Igarashi, supra note 55, at 5–6. See generally Margaret
Broderick, Associated Statehood—A New Form of Decolonisation, 17 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 368
(1968).
72 See Igarashi, supra note 55, at 4–5.
73 See Reisman, supra note 71, at 10; see also Igarashi, supra note 55, at 5–6.
74 U.N. Charter art. 73.
75 G.A. Res. 334 (IV), ¶ 2, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess. (Dec. 2, 1949).
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a territory on equal status with other component parts of the metropolitan or other country.”76 Puerto Rico, the principal subject of this
Article, became perhaps the first explicit freely associated state in
1952.77 As relevant here, the general factors indicative of free association included the following under the heading “constitutional considerations”: “(i) whether the constitutional guarantees extend equally to
the associated territory, (ii) whether there are constitutional fields reserved to the territory, and (iii) whether there is provision for the participation of the territory on a basis of equality in any changes in the
constitutional system of the State.”78
The guidelines, in other words, contemplated that where association did not effectively mean integration, but rather an intermediate
status between integration and independence, sovereign competences
would be divided between the associate and the principal, yet constitutional guarantees would apply, within some reasonable margin of appreciation, equally to the territory of each.79
Resolution 1541 explicitly recognized free association as a form of
self-determination, and its Annex sets out the essential factors relevant
to assessing the legality and propriety of freely associated states. Principle VII of the Resolution requires that free association be achieved
through democratic processes that reflect the “free and voluntary
choice by the peoples of the territory concerned” and that it be a status
that “respects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the
territory and its peoples.”80 Furthermore, the status of free association
does not terminate the self-determination process; rather, as already
noted, the people of a freely associated state retain the right “to modify
the status of [their] territory through the expression of their will by
democratic means and through constitutional processes.”81 Finally, rela76 G.A. Res. 567 (VI), at 62, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess. ( Jan. 18, 1952). At that time, the
concept of “free association” apparently subsumed both full integration and what would
now be called associated statehood. The Assembly recommended “further study” of the
situation of territories that “have become neither independent nor fully integrated within
another State but which have already attained a full measure of self-government in their
internal affairs.” Id. at 61; see also Igarashi, supra note 55, at 29.
77 See G.A. Res. 748, supra note 15, at 25–26.
78 G.A. Res. 567, supra note 76, at 62.
79 See id.
80 G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 56, at 29, Annex, Principle VII(a).
81 See id.; see also Igarashi, supra note 55, at 242 (“The right of an Associate State to
terminate unilaterally the association arrangement is an essential component of the right
of self-determination.”). Principle VIII, which offers authoritative guidance on the selfdetermination option of integration, emphasizes that it must be on the basis of full equality of citizenship, rights, and freedoms as between the former colonized people and the
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tive to the principal, a freely associated state “should have the right to
determine its internal constitution without outside interference,” although this “does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free association agreed upon.”82 Resolution
1541 thus offered critical guidance on the indicia of and substantive
criteria for associated statehood as a mode of genuine self-determination in the era of decolonization.
But just as it would be too simple to consider the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States the final word on the essential criteria for statehood,83 it would be equally so to view Resolution
1541 in that way relative to associated states. International law recognizes as lawful a range of associated states, some of which manifest
greater dependence on the principal than others.84 The precise contours of associated statehood must be flexible enough to accommodate
diverse historical, economic, social, cultural, and political circumstances. At the same time, flexibility can only extend so far: associated
states cannot surrender so much autonomy as to be indistinguishable
from colonies or protectorates. Indicia or criteria for assessing the legality of associated states include, inter alia, the existence of universal
suffrage, substantial internal autonomy, “the extent to which the association conduces to a better fulfillment of the human (including economic and social) rights deemed under contemporary prescriptions to
be minimum international standards,”85 and the availability of procedures for either terminating or modifying associated statehood should
the associate’s people determine it no longer to be in their interest.86
citizens of the independent state, but it does not explicitly retain for the former a future
right to modify this status. See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 56, at 30, Annex, Principle VIII.
International law would be unlikely to allow a people that chose integration to engage in a
further act of external self-determination, except perhaps, as the Canadian Supreme
Court said, “as a last resort,” if that “people is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its
right to self-determination internally.” See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R.
217, ¶¶ 134–35.
82 G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 56, at 29–30, Annex, Principle VII(b).
83 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097,
165 L.N.T.S. 19.
84 Examples include the Cook Islands with New Zealand; and the arrangements of the
former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (“TTPI”)—the CNMI, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau—with the United States. On the
Cook Islands, see Igarashi, supra note 55, at 68–112. On the former TTPI associated
states, see Chimène I. Keitner & W. Michael Reisman, Free Association: The United States Experience, 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 1, 33–58 (2004).
85 Reisman, supra note 71, at 12.
86 See Igarashi, supra note 55, at 65–66 (enumerating criteria proposed by scholars as
indicative of or essential to associated statehood).
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In short, as it has evolved to date, the international status of free
association requires constitutional arrangements both internally (within
the associate) and externally (within the principal) that, at once, (1)
guarantee core international human rights, including equal protection
of the laws and meaningful political representation, and (2) reserve certain legal fields for the associate.87 Yet free association also, by definition,
implies political subordination. With every freely associated state, the
challenge is to establish a legal framework that can accommodate an
enduring relationship of political inequality between the principal and
associate without compromising the individual equality of their respective peoples and the collective right of the self-determining entity. This
is not an easy task under the best of circumstances.88 The U.S. Constitution further complicates it.
II. The Status of Puerto Rico: Commonwealth or Colony?
A. Historical Evolution
On reflection, the tension between contemporary international law
and U.S. constitutional law should not be surprising. International law
today differs profoundly from that of the late eighteenth century. During the era of the Constitution’s framing, colonialism had been an established and accepted feature of the international legal order. The
Declaration of Independence—notwithstanding the well-known Jeffersonian rhetoric referring to a supposedly “self-evident” truth that governments “deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed”89—did not justify separation from Great Britain based on a repudiation of colonialism, which flourished for almost another two
centuries. Instead, it defended the right “to dissolve the political bands”
between the American colonies and the British Crown based on “a long
train of abuses and usurpations” perpetrated by the latter,90 an argument that does not cast doubt on the general validity of colonialism.
87 See G.A. Res. 567, supra note 76, at 62.
88 Furthermore, because free association may at times be not a final act of selfdetermination, but rather a kind of least common denominator for territorial communities unable to agree internally on a self-determination option—with some residents favoring independence, others integration with the principal, and still others the status quo—
certain forms of associated statehood may be a sign of political inertia. Puerto Rico may be
a case in point.
89 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
90 Id. paras. 1, 2. Much of the Declaration consists, in essence, of a “bill of particulars”
alleging a litany of misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance on the part of England in
the administration of the American colonies. See id.
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Indeed, the Constitution’s ratification twelve years later took place
against an international legal backdrop that presupposed this colonial
framework. Gouverneur Morris, who drafted the Territories Clause,
which governs U.S. territories during peacetime,91 candidly admitted in
1803: “I always thought that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them
no voice in our councils. In wording the [Territories Clause], I went as
far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion.”92
It was therefore neither internationally unlawful nor of particular
interest to the major European powers when the United States acquired far-flung island possessions stretching from Asia to the Caribbean following the Spanish-American War and governed them as “provinces” with “no voice in our councils.”93 Of course, the mechanisms of
governance of federal territory generated heated debate (and the occasional civil war) within the United States from the founding era
through the early twentieth century.94 But the international law of the
era cast no doubt on the legality of U.S. control over the affairs and
destinies of its territorial possessions—or of the peoples inhabiting
them.
After World War II, of course, matters changed profoundly. International law rapidly evolved to recognize a robust right of peoples to
self-determination, that is, the right to “freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”95 Article 73 of the U.N. Charter, to which the United States is a
founding State party, requires metropolitan member States96 to govern
such territories in their inhabitants’ interests, to promote the progres91 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. During wartime, occupied territory is governed by
the President pursuant to the “executive Power,” although the authors disagree about the
scope of that power and the extent to which it may be subjected to congressional and international legal constraints. On the interplay between peacetime and wartime governance
of American territory, see generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution: Governing Without Authority, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 581 (2001).
92 See Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Henry W. Livingston, supra note 1, at 192.
Morris admitted with further candor that had his ambitions for Canada and Louisiana
“been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.” Id. But this
opposition had nothing to do with an aversion to colonialism.
93 See id.
94 See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Constitution of Empire: Territorial Expansion and American Legal History (2004) (providing an overview of the
issues and debates surrounding American acquisition and governance of territory).
95 See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 1.
96 U.N. Charter art. 73 (applying to “[m]embers of the United Nations which have or
assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet
attained a full measure of self-government”).
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sive development of an appropriate form of self-government, and “to
transmit regularly to the Secretary-General . . . statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories.”97 In 1946, the U.N. General Assembly also established the Trusteeship Council,98 which would administer a trusteeship system to decolonize and establish some form of selfgovernment in extant former colonies, mandates, and other non-selfgoverning territories.99
Now, when the Charter entered into force on October 24, 1945,
the United States held several territories subject to these mandates,100
including Puerto Rico, which it had acquired in 1898 (along with Cuba,
Guam, and the Philippines) under the terms of the Treaty of Paris after
the Spanish-American War.101 By and large, postwar U.S. practice toward its colonies rapidly evolved to meet international law’s new demands. The United States granted the Philippines full independence in
1946.102 Hawaii and Alaska became the forty-ninth and fiftieth states of
the Union in 1959. Although initially reluctant to surrender control
over the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (“TTPI”) because of its
geostrategic value,103 as the Cold War wound down in the 1980s and
1990s, the United States worked out compacts of free association with
its constituents.104 These arrangements reflected the wishes of the peoples of these former territories, as expressed in free and fair plebiscites,
97 See id.
98 G.A. Res. 64 (I), at 122–23, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess. (Dec. 14, 1946); see also U.N. Charter arts. 86–91.
99 See U.N. Charter arts. 75–85.
100 As of 1952, the United States bore responsibility for one trust territory (the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, formerly under Japanese mandate) and six non-selfgoverning territories (Alaska, American Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands). See 3 Foreign Relations of the United States 1952–1954, at 1081
(Ralph R. Goodwin ed., 1979); 1 Foreign Relations of the United States 1947, at 283
(1973). The United States initially submitted information on the Panama Canal Zone pursuant to Article 73(e), but after the Republic of Panama objected, the United States
agreed to cease to “transmit information in [the] future on this territory without consulting the Republic of Panama” first. 1 Foreign Relations of the United States 1947,
supra at 283.
101 See Treaty of Paris arts. I–III, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
102 See Treaty of General Relations between the United States of America and the Republic of the Philippines, U.S.-Phil., July 4, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1568.
103 See Keitner & Reisman, supra note 84, at 34–35.
104 These include the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Republic of Palau, and the CNMI. See 48 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1973 (2006). For an
overview, see Keitner & Reisman, supra note 84, at 33–58. The CNMI has a conceptually
distinct and constitutionally more problematic legal relationship with the United States
than the others, for reasons we explore below. See id. at 41–43.
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and they clearly satisfy the imperatives of contemporary international
law.105 For the most part, they also pose no constitutional problems.106
Matters are more complicated, however, with respect to Puerto
Rico and the CNMI. Unlike Alaska, Hawaii, and the other freely associated states carved from the former TTPI, neither Puerto Rico nor the
CNMI has requested either independence from the United States
(separation) or admission to the Union as a state (integration), and the
United States has therefore had no occasion to decide whether to accede to such a request.107 Both territories instead describe themselves
as commonwealths and operate with a degree of effective autonomy
pursuant to compacts of some kind between them and the United
States, which purport to vest them with substantial self-governance
powers.108 At the same time, despite some historical developments that
might suggest otherwise, all three branches of the federal government
assert that the United States ultimately retains plenary authority over all
territories, which include, in their view, Puerto Rico and the CNMI109—
105 See Keitner & Reisman, supra note 84, at 33–58.
106 In Professor Lawson’s view, the sole constitutional defect in the relationship between the United States and the former TTPI states (save for the CNMI) is one of form,
insofar as that relationship should have been constructed pursuant to an actual Article II
treaty. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Professor Sloane, in contrast, does not regard congressional-executive or sole executive agreements as unconstitutional as such, although he
reserves judgment on whether they may constitutionally be used in lieu of an Article II
treaty in this particular context.
107 See Keitner & Reisman, supra note 84, at 21–27, 38–44.
108 See id.
109 See, e.g., United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act, H.R. 856, 105th Cong. § 2(4)
(1998) (“The Commonwealth [of Puerto Rico] remains an unincorporated territory and
does not have the status of ‘free association’ with the United States as that status is defined
under United States law or international practice.”); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651–
52 (1980) (“Congress, which is empowered under the Territory Clause of the Constitution
. . . to ‘make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory . . . belonging to
the United States,’ may treat Puerto Rico differently from States so long as there is a rational basis for its actions”); Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s
Status 5–6 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/2007-report-by-thepresident-task-force-on-puerto-rico-status.pdf (“Congress may continue the current commonwealth system indefinitely, but it necessarily retains the constitutional authority to
revise or revoke the powers of self-government currently exercised by the government of
Puerto Rico.”); see also United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2d 1143, 1152–53 (11th Cir. 1993)
(“Congress may unilaterally repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution or the Puerto Rican
Federal Relations Act and replace them with any rules or regulations of its choice.”). The
courts, however, have not been entirely consistent. See, e.g., Rodríguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 8 (1982) (“Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 42 (1st Cir. 1985) (“Under the compact
between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States, Congress cannot amend the
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even if, to date, the political branches have been generally disinclined
in practice to interfere in their affairs or to exercise that plenary authority. Still, according to the United States, the de facto selfgovernance enjoyed by both Puerto Rico and the CNMI is, in the final
analysis, a matter of legislative grace rather than legal right. Furthermore, neither enjoys a democratic voice in the exercise of this plenary
federal power.110 The constitutional status of these entities, to say the
least, is unclear.
B. The Constitutional Framework for Territorial Governance
At first glance, the Constitution’s rules for territorial governance
seem simple. The Territories Clause gives Congress “Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States.”111 Nothing in the Territories Clause distinguishes among individual territories or classes of territories.112 It grants Congress “general and plenary”113 power with respect to federal territory, which amounts to “full and complete legislative authority over the people of the Territories and all the departments

Puerto Rico Constitution unilaterally, and the government of Puerto Rico is no longer a
federal government agency exercising delegated power.”).
110 Political parties can, of course, choose to give territorial citizens a say in the selection of party candidates for federal office: hence the recent Democratic primary, for example, in Puerto Rico. See, e.g., Susan Milligan, Presidential Primary Brings Attention, Frustration to Puerto Rico, Boston Globe, May 31, 2008, at A1. We focus in this article on Puerto
Rico, although several of our conclusions might apply with equal force to the CNMI. For
analysis of the CNMI, see generally Joseph E. Horey, The Right of Self-Government in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 4 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 180 (2003); Jennifer C.
Davis, Comment, Beneath the American Flag: United States Law and International Principles
Governing the Covenant Between the United States and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, 13 Transnat’l Law. 135 (2000); Gretchen Kirschenheiter, Note, Resolving the Hostility: Which Laws Apply to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands When Federal and
Local Laws Conflict, 21 U. Haw. L. Rev. 237 (1999).
111 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
112 See id. In the Dred Scott decision, Justice Taney, along with a plurality of Justices,
tried to argue that the Territories Clause only embraced territory that belonged to the
United States when the Constitution was ratified in 1788. See Scott v. Sandford (Dred
Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432–43, 448–49 (1857). As with much of the Dred Scott decision, this was patent nonsense: the reference in the clause to “Territory” applies to afteracquired territory just as surely as the reference to “other Property” refers to other kinds of
after-acquired property—as Albert Gallatin had pointed out more than half a century before Dred Scott. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 75.
113 Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1, 42 (1890).
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of the territorial governments.”114 Relative to the territories, Congress is
not limited to the enumerations of powers found outside the Territories
Clause; the clause itself effectively constitutes Congress as a general government.115 To be sure, even as a general government that need not
find authorization for action in any enumerated constitutional power
other than the Territories Clause, affirmative prohibitions in the Constitution, such as those in Article I, Section 9, or the Bill of Rights, constrain Congress’s ability to govern the territories to some extent.116 At
that point, however, matters go from simple to anything but.
Case law from more than a century ago gives Congress freedom to
legislate for at least some territories in a fashion that would violate the
Constitution in other contexts. A series of Supreme Court decisions in
1901, known collectively as The Insular Tariff Cases,117 held that the Constitution’s requirements that “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States” and that “[n]o Tax or Duty
shall be laid on Articles exported from any State” did not apply to
Puerto Rico or to other noncontiguous island territories, so that Congress could impose duties on goods exported from Puerto Rico to the
United States.118 That doctrine quickly expanded to include other constitutional provisions that, in the Court’s view, did not necessarily apply
to all federal territories.119 In particular, the inhabitants of territories
denominated “incorporated” —a vague and ill-defined term that suggests suitability for future statehood120—enjoy the protection of all rele114 Nat’l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880); see also Sere v. Pitot, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 337 (1810).
115 See County of Yankton, 101 U.S. at 133; see also Sere, 10 U.S. at 337.
116 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9; id. amends. I–X.
117 See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901)(The Insular Tariff Cases).
118 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. Clearly, Puerto Rico is not a state,
so the Exports Clause by its terms does not apply to Puerto Rico. But if Puerto Rico is part
of the United States, and if no duties are permitted on interstate commerce, then the Uniformity Clause seems to require that there be no duties as well on state-to-territory or territory-to-state commerce. Such, at least, was the argument advanced, and rejected by the
Supreme Court, in The Insular Tariff Cases. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 194–
95.
119 For a brief critical summary of The Insular Cases (as they came to be called once
they were no longer limited to tariff matters), see Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at
194–97. For a more thorough treatment by one of the lawyers principally involved in the
early litigation, see generally Frederic R. Coudert, The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial
Incorporation, 26 Colum. L. Rev. 823 (1926).
120 Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2254 (2008) (describing incorporated territories as “surely destined for statehood”), with United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (describing unincorporated territories as “not clearly
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vant provisions of the Constitution even without congressional extension of those provisions to the territory. In contrast, their counterparts
in “unincorporated” territories enjoy the protection of only those provisions viewed by the Court as “fundamental,” absent congressional action making other provisions applicable.121
The category of fundamental rights is as arbitrary and ill-defined as
the concept of incorporation. Specific cases hold, for example, that the
rights to jury trial122 and indictment by grand jury,123 which the founding generation would have regarded as the archetype of fundamental
rights,124 do not automatically extend to unincorporated territories.
Even though, to the best of our knowledge and research, no current
scholar, from any methodological perspective, defends The Insular Cases,
they remain good law, and “their longevity is now cited against assertions
that they ought to be reconsidered.”125 Indeed, in 2008 in Boumediene v.
Bush, the Supreme Court, in deciding that alleged enemy combatants
detained at Guantanamo Bay enjoy the right to review of their detention
through habeas corpus, stated that the “century-old doctrine [of The
Insular Cases] informs our analysis in the present matter.”126

destined for statehood”). Before statehood-candidacy emerged as the evident touchstone
for “incorporated” status, the Court toyed with other possible meanings of the term, such
as the citizenship status of territorial inhabitants or the language of the treaties of acquisition. See generally Juan R. Torruella, The Insular Cases: The Establishment of a Regime of Political Apartheid, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 283 (2007) (providing a deconstruction of the evolution
of the term “incorporation” during the first quarter of the twentieth century). In the end,
we think there is much to be said for Justice John Marshall Harlan’s comments in one of
the earliest Insular Cases: “I am constrained to say that this idea of ‘incorporation’ has some
occult meaning which my mind does not apprehend. It is enveloped in some mystery
which I am unable to unravel.” See Downes, 182 U.S. at 391 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1922).
122 See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (concluding that the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial did not extend to the territories of the United States without legislation so extending it).
123 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215–18 (1903) (finding that the Constitution’s Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not not extend to Hawaii as a territory). This decision is especially ironic given Hawaii’s current status.
124 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 83,
96 (1998).
125 See Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 5.
126 128 S. Ct. at 2255.
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C. Puerto Rico’s Decolonization: From Colony to Associated State?
As with most federal territories, Puerto Rico has gone through several stages within this constitutional framework.127 Spain ceded Puerto
Rico to the United States in the Treaty of Paris that ended the SpanishAmerican War.128 Ratifications of the treaty were exchanged on April
11, 1899, which formally brought Puerto Rico within the compass of
congressional power under the Territories Clause.129
More than a year later, on April 12, 1900, Congress enacted a statute (with an effective date of May 1, 1900) providing for a civil government for Puerto Rico.130 Under the statute, Puerto Ricans were allowed
to elect members of one house of the territorial legislature, but all
other legislative and executive officers were federal appointees. Over
time, Congress progressively increased the participation of Puerto Ricans in their local government.131 In 1917, by virtue of the Jones Act,
both houses of the legislature became elective, and Puerto Ricans were
granted (at least nominal) U.S. citizenship, although they did not receive voting rights in presidential or congressional elections.132 In 1947,
Congress authorized local election of the Puerto Rican governor.133
This marked the first time in U.S. history that a territorial governor was
elected by the territory’s people rather than appointed federally.134
In 1948, Puerto Rico held national elections in which various political parties and candidates on the island promoted, respectively, the
127 Puerto Rico has been within the jurisdiction of a foreign power since 1493, when
Christopher Columbus claimed it on behalf of Spain during his second voyage. Olga
Jiménez de Wagenheim, Puerto Rico: An Interpretive History from Pre-Columbian
Times to 1900, at 36–37 (1998). For a short history of Spanish governance, see Reisman,
supra note 71, at 24–26.
128 See Treaty of Paris, supra note 101, art. II.
129 See id.
130 See Foraker Act, ch. 191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900). Until the Foraker Act took effect, U.S.
military authorities governed Puerto Rico. The constitutionality of non-statutory military
governance of a territory during peacetime is at best dubious as an original matter. See
generally Lawson & Seidman, supra note 91. The Supreme Court sustained it in 1854, however, in Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164 (1854), and later applied that decision to
validate the military governments in Puerto Rico. See Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260,
264–66 (1909); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 234 (1901).
131 See Dorian A. Shaw, Note, The Status of Puerto Rico Revisited: Does the Current U.S.Puerto Rico Relationship Uphold International Law?, 17 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1006, 1020–21
(1994).
132 See Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
133 Act of Aug. 5, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-362, ch. 490, § 1, 61 Stat. 770, 770–71.
134 Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 132. Arguably, the mayor of the District of
Columbia from 1812 to 1871 was the first exception to this principle, but the extent of his
authority was more ambiguous than that of the Puerto Rican governor. See id. at 235 n.55.

26

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 50:1

three self-determination options set out in the preceding part: independence as a new sovereign State, integration as a state of the United
States, or an intermediate commonwealth status in association with the
United States.135 Those candidates favoring the last preference prevailed, while those favoring “statehood for Puerto Rico and independence for Puerto Rico were defeated,” and so in 1950, at the insistence
of Puerto Rico’s resident commissioner, Congress introduced Public
Law 600 to authorize the adoption of a Puerto Rican constitution.136 It
provides in part:
Whereas the Congress of the United States by a series of enactments has progressively recognized the right of selfgovernment of the people of Puerto Rico; and
Whereas under the terms of these congressional enactments
an increasingly large measure of self-government has been
achieved: Therefore
. . . [F]ully recognizing the principle of government by consent, this Act is now adopted in the nature of a compact so that
the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.137
Public Law 600 further indicated that “[u]pon approval by the
Congress the constitution shall become effective in accordance with its
terms,”138 and it accordingly reconfigured the statutory framework governing the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico to
accommodate the anticipated constitutional commonwealth government.139 Thereafter, Puerto Rico held a constitutional convention and
promptly drafted a proposed constitution. Congress approved it subject

135 See Oct. 30 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 42, at 798; see also Surendra
Bhana, The United States and the Development of the Puerto Rican Status
Question 1936–1968, at 114 (1975) (noting that in the 1948 election, “the island’s
872,114 registered voters were being called upon to choose from three major sets of candidates, each one fairly clear on where it stood on the status question”); Memorandum by
the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Cessation of Transmission of Information Under Article 73(e) of the Charter with Regard to the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, in 28 Dep’t St. Bull. 585, 586 ¶ 10 (Apr. 20, 1953) [hereinafter Memorandum with regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico].
136 Memorandum with regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, supra note 135, at
586 ¶ 10; see also Oct. 30 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 42, at 798.
137 Act of July 3, 1950, § 1, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319, 319 (emphasis added).
138 Id. § 3.
139 Id. §§ 4–6.
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to three mandatory amendments,140 and Puerto Rico then adopted it as
amended, effective July 25, 1952.141
D. “In the Nature of a Compact”
Public Law 600’s description of itself as a statute “adopted in the
nature of a compact” is, to the best of our knowledge and research, unprecedented.142 It is also, perhaps deliberately,143 ambiguous. Indeed,
the term “compact” is itself somewhat mysterious.144 A statute “adopted
in the nature of a compact” leaves even more to speculation. Further
complicating the issue, the preamble to Public Law 447, which recalls
Public Law 600, places a slightly different gloss on the compact formulation: it says that Congress adopted Public Law 600, not “in the nature
of” a compact but “as a compact with the people of Puerto Rico.”145
Whether these subtle distinctions had any significance to the drafters
and, in general, what Congress (collectively) meant by a compact is unclear from the text. In plain language, however, a compact denotes a
binding agreement of some sort. It is therefore certainly arguable that a
statute adopted either “as” or “in the nature of” a compact may not be
modified unilaterally. Officials of the United States conveyed this impression of Public Law 600, repeatedly and forcefully, in their oral and
written communications to the U.N. General Assembly, concluding that
140 See Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327,327–28. In particular, Congress insisted that Puerto Rico (1) add a provision requiring that any amendment to the
constitution “be consistent with the resolution enacted by the Congress of the United
States approving this Constitution, with the applicable provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, with the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act [Act of Mar. 2, 1917, ch. 145, 39
Stat. 951 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.)], and with Public Law
600, Eighty-first Congress, adopted in the nature of a compact[;]” (2) delete a provision
recognizing certain social and economic rights; and (3) add a provision “assuring continuance of private elementary schools.” Reisman, supra note 71, at 33 (internal quotation
marks deleted).
141 See Antonio Fernós-Isern, U.S. Special Rep. to Committee IV (Trusteeship), Oct. 30
Statement by Dr. Fernós-Isern, in 29 Dep’t St. Bull. 798, 799 (Dec. 1953) [hereinafter
Oct. 30 Statement by Antonio Fernós-Isern].
142 The term “compact” itself had seldom appeared in U.S. law. See Arnold H. Leibowitz, The Applicability of Federal Law to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 56 Geo L.J. 219, 225
(1967). Before Public Law 600, it had been used “in the Northwest Ordinance and in a few
enabling acts where it appears that a binding obligation on the part of the federal government was envisaged.” Id.
143 See Shaw, supra note 131, at 1041–42.
144 See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 460–72 (1978). See
generally David E. Engdahl, Characterization of Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a
Compact?, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 63 (1965).
145 See Act of July 3, 1952, pmbl., 66 Stat. at 327 (emphasis added).

28

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 50:1

reports about Puerto Rico submitted under Article 73(e) should
cease.146 Puerto Rico, they said, had—by virtue of the events described
above—attained a new political status in association with, but no longer
subject to the unfettered authority of, the United States.147
Frances P. Bolton, for example, a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives and a principal U.S. delegate to the General Assembly,
explained that whereas “[t]he previous status of Puerto Rico was that of
a territory subject to the full authority of the Congress of the United
States in all governmental matters,” after Public Law 600, the adoption
of the Puerto Rican Constitution, and its approval by Congress in Public Law 447, the (unilateral) congressional statutes formerly governing
Puerto Rico had been effectively merged into the “provisions of a compact of a bilateral nature whose terms may be changed only by common consent.”148 Furthermore, she cited her colleagues Senator Hugh
Alfred Butler, chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and a co-sponsor of Public Law 600, and Congressman Arthur Lewis Miller, chairman of the House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, as well as a decision of a U.S. district court, as authority
for the view that Puerto Rico’s constitution now formed part of “a relationship between two parties which may not be amended or abrogated
unilaterally.”149 Puerto Rico, she concluded, henceforth constituted “a
state associated with the United States,” which “is not a constitutional part
of the Federal Union but is associated with the Union by virtue of a bilateral compact.”150
Mason Sears, the U.S. delegate to both the Trusteeship Council
and the General Assembly’s Committee on Information on Non-SelfGoverning Territories, echoed Bolton’s assurances.151 “A compact,” he
said, “is far stronger than a treaty. A treaty can be denounced by either
side, whereas a compact cannot be denounced by either party unless it
has the permission of the other.”152 In its memorandum explaining why
146 See, e.g., Memorandum with regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, supra
note 135, at 885–88; Oct. 30 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 42, at 797–98.
147 See Nov. 3 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 14, at 802–04.
148 See id. at 804.
149 Oct. 30 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 42, at 798; see also Nov. 3 Statement
by Frances Bolton, supra note 14, at 802 (representing that “there exists a bilateral compact of association between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States which has
been accepted by both and which in accordance with judicial decisions may not be
amended without common consent”).
150 Oct. 30 Statement by Frances. Bolton, supra note 42, at 799.
151 See José Trías Monge, Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the
World 122–23 (1997).
152 Quoted in Trías Monge, supra note 151, at 123.
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Article 73(e) reports on Puerto Rico would no longer be filed, the
United States insisted that “Puerto Rico shall have, under that Constitution, freedom from control or interference by the Congress in respect
of internal government and administration . . . [and] complete autonomy in internal economic matters and in cultural and social affairs under a Constitution adopted by them and approved by the Congress.”153
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., then the principal U.S. Representative to the
General Assembly, likewise affirmed Puerto Rico’s “new status,” as set
forth in more detail by Representative Bolton and by the Puerto Rican
representative, Antonio Fernós-Isern.154 Finally, it is worth noting here
that Bolton explicitly rejected the suggestion that, subsequent to the
compact, Congress would retain plenary authority over Puerto Rico.155
Puerto Rico confirmed that it shared the U.S. understanding of
the compact and its new status.156 Governor Luis Muñoz Marín, in a
letter to President Eisenhower reprinted as an appendix to the U.S.
memorandum to the General Assembly, described the compact and
concluded that “[o]ur status and the terms of our association with the
United States cannot be changed without our full consent.”157 Dr.
Fernós-Isern subsequently related in detail the sequence of events by
which Puerto Rico had arrived at its present status, explained the
Commonwealth’s structure and the terms of its association with the
United States, and concluded that after its establishment, “the last vestige of colonialism has disappeared in Puerto Rico.”158 Consequently, in
1953, based on the explicit representations of both the United States
and Puerto Rico, the General Assembly declared that
in the framework of their Constitution and of the compact
agreed upon with the United States of America, the people of
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have been invested with
153 Memorandum with regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, supra note 135, at
587 ¶¶ 21–22.
154 Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., U.S. Rep. to the General Assembly, Nov. 27 Statement to
the Plenary Session, in 29 Dep’t St. Bull. 841, 841 (Dec. 1953).
155 Nov. 3 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 14, at 802; accord Oct. 30 Statement
by Antonio Fernós-Isern, supra note 141, at 801 (referring to the view that the U.S. Congress may unilaterally modify the relationship established by Public Law 600 and its aftermath as “a mistaken interpretation” and reiterating that “the compact between the United
States and Puerto Rico can be amended or repealed only by mutual consent”).
156 See Oct. 30 Statement by Antonio Fernós-Isern, supra note 141, at 799; see also Letter
from Luis Muñoz Marin, supra note 42, at 588–89.
157 Letter from Luis Muñoz Marin, supra note 42, at 589.
158 Oct. 30 Statement by Antonio Fernós-Isern, supra note 141, at 798–802. Like Bolton, he also affirmed that the compact could not be modified except by mutual consent.
Id. at 799.
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attributes of political sovereignty which clearly identify the
status of self-government attained by the Puerto Rican people
as that of an autonomous political entity . . . .159
Now, if it is true that, because of Public Law 600 and its progeny,
Puerto Rico’s internal self-governance arrangements and the scope of
U.S. power over Puerto Rico may be changed from the 1952 baseline
only with Puerto Rico’s consent (as these statements suggest), then
Puerto Rico clearly qualifies as a genuine associated state, with a local
government that operates under the authority of the bilateral compact
to which the above statements repeatedly refer. The United States, in
that event, has also clearly discharged its decolonization obligations
relative to Puerto Rico.160 Puerto Ricans approved Public Law 600 and
the Puerto Rican Constitution in free and fair referenda,161 thus exercising their right as a former colony to external self-determination by
choosing associated statehood in connection with the United States of
America.162 These events doubtless qualify as a recognized form of selfdetermination under the international framework set forth in the preceding part of this Article.
159 G.A. Res. 748, supra note 15, at 26.
160 In light of the decolonization norms that evolved under the U.N. Charter and the
various resolutions of the General Assembly enumerated above, were the people of Puerto
Rico subsequently to vote to change their status from associated statehood to full independence, it is likely that contemporary international law would require the United States
to accede to that freely determined political status. See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 1. To
repeat, in modern parlance, Puerto Rico, as a former colony, enjoys an external right to
self-determination, which vitiates the usual presumption against secession. Yet in the most
recent referendum, held in 1998, only 2.54 percent of those participating voted for independence from the United States. See Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto
Rico’s Status, supra note 109, at 3–4. This is not to suggest, however, that a majority of
Puerto Ricans favor admission to the Union as a state. The actual implications of this referendum remain unclear. In particular, the referendum offered Puerto Rican voters “the
options of statehood, independence, a continuation of the current commonwealth arrangement, and ‘free associated status’ (a treaty-based relationship with the United States
that purports to grant Puerto Rico full sovereignty and does not guarantee U.S. citizenship
to persons born in Puerto Rico).” Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 74. But “[a] fifth option—
‘none of the above’—won, receiving 50.4 percent of the vote.” Id. Professor T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, among others, argues that this indicates, not “political nihilism” among Puerto
Ricans, but rather “that the options crafted by the ruling pro-statehood party did not adequately reflect their preferences. . . . Rather, they seek an ‘enhanced’ commonwealth
status that would increase Puerto Rican autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government.” Id. at
87.
161 The people of Puerto Rico also approved the amendments upon which Congress
conditioned its consent to the Puerto Rican constitution and then reapproved the
amended constitution in another referendum. See Reisman, supra note 71, at 33.
162 See Letter from Luis Muñoz Marin, supra note 42, at 588–89.
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From a domestic and, in particular, a constitutional standpoint,
however, the idea that Public Law 600 and the events that followed collectively constitute a compact with Puerto Rico of the sort represented
to the United Nations is, at a minimum, questionable. Even assuming
for the moment that the Constitution authorizes Congress to bind itself
irrevocably and in perpetuity to a bilateral governance arrangement
with Puerto Rico of the sort described by U.S. delegates to the United
Nations in 1953, it is far from clear—notwithstanding Bolton’s assurances—that either Public Law 600 or Public Law 447 intended to or did
accomplish this feat.163
In terms of its plain language, Public Law 600, on its face, calls for
Puerto Ricans to hold a referendum on that statute and, assuming an
affirmative vote, authorizes a convention to draft a Puerto Rican constitution, which “shall provide a republican form of government and shall
include a bill of rights.”164 That constitution, provided that it conforms
to Public Law 600 and that Congress and the President first approve it,
thereafter “shall become effective in accordance with its terms.”165 Public Law 600 also repeals enumerated portions of the federal statutory
regime that existed at that time.166
As a textual matter, except by major and questionable inferences
from the ambiguous phrase “in the nature of a compact,” it is at best
strained to read the law as purporting to lock into place in perpetuity a
163 The question whether and when one Congress may bind a subsequent Congress
has deeply engaged many thinkers. Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665, 1668–93 (2002) (defending a general entrenchment power), with John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 Va. L. Rev. 385, 390–416 (2003) (arguing
against a general power of Congress to bind successor congresses), and Stewart E. Sterk,
Retrenchment on Entrenchment, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 231, 237–54 (2003) (same). Scholars
and legal actors considering the effect of Public Law 600 have specifically engaged the
question. See, e.g., The Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status: Hearing Before
the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. 84–93 (statement
of Charles J. Cooper, Brian S. Koukoutchos & David H. Thompson) (2006); José Trías
Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View of the Political Condition of
Puerto Rico, 68 Rev. Jur. U.P.R. 1, 21–22 (1999). We have no desire to plunge directly into
that thicket. Professor Lawson wishes to note that the Engagements Clause of Article VI
provides for a specific kind of entrenchment, including entrenchment of the Northwest
Ordinance, which might counsel against lightly inferring a more general power of entrenchment. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 1 (“All Debts contracted and Engagements entered
into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States
under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.”). But that is as far as he is willing to
go at present.
164 Act of July 3, 1950, § 2, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319, 319.
165 Id. § 3.
166 Id. §§ 4–5.
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relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States, which may not
be modified without the former’s mandatory consent.167 Nothing in the
text, for example, purports to be a congressional pledge not to reenact
the repealed provisions of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act
(“PRFRA”)—or not to enact new (perhaps equally or more intrusive)
provisions.168 According to its preamble, Congress adopted Public Law
600 “so that the people of Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own adoption.”169 Leaving aside the arguable significance of the novel phrase “in the nature of a compact,”
this purpose is entirely consistent with the prior century and a half of
territorial governance.170 Historically, the federal government has generally sought to provide as much scope for territorial self-government
as circumstances permitted, but always subject to the paramount power
of Congress lurking in the background.171 From a textualist standpoint,
to read the elliptical phrase “in the nature of a compact” to surrender
this paramount power is strained.172
Furthermore, in Public Law 447, Congress, although affirming
that the Puerto Rican Constitution conformed generally to its prior directive that the constitution “contain[] a bill of rights” and “provide[]
for a republican form of government,”” approved that constitution subject to three compulsory amendments.173 The fact that Congress presupposed that it did retain power to require Puerto Rico to modify its
constitution seems to evince its belief that it had not surrendered plenary authority over the island—despite its virtually contemporaneous
representations to the contrary before the United Nations.174 At the
same time, it may be recalled that the Puerto Rican Constitution, which
Congress approved in Public Law 447, states that “political power emanates from the people [of Puerto Rico] and shall be exercised in accordance with their will, within the terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico and the United States of America.”175
167 See id. § 1. But see Leibowitz, supra note 142, at 222 & n.14 (collecting citations for
the proposition that the compact indeed established a sui generis political entity that lies
outside the constitutional ambit of the Territories Clause and therefore may not “be
changed without the consent of both Puerto Rico and the United States”).
168 See Act of July 3, 1950, 64 Stat. at 319–20.
169 Id. § 1.
170 See id.
171 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
172 Act of July 3, 1950, § 1, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319, 319.
173 See infra notes 142–159 and accompanying text.
174 See, e.g., Nov. 3 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 14, at 802–04.
175 Puerto Rico Const. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
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A strong argument may be advanced that Congress, by approving the
constitution, perforce approved this statement—although that still fails
to clarify precisely what either Public Law 600, Public Law 447, or the
Puerto Rican Constitution means by “compact.”
Of course, as noted earlier, U.S. officials repeatedly made strong,
clear, and public representations to the United Nations affirming,
among other things, that future changes to the terms of the U.S.-Puerto
Rico relationship must be approved bilaterally.176 Because of these representations, the United States, as a State, bound itself as a matter of
international law to respect that arrangement—regardless of what
Congress may have intended. It is well established that a State may, by
repeated, public representations intended to induce reliance on the
part of other States (or another class of international participant), bind
itself unilaterally.177 The United States did just that; among other indicia of reliance, its representations induced the General Assembly to
adopt a resolution agreeing that reports on Puerto Rico’s status under
Article 73(e) were not required after 1952.178 The United States thereby
bound itself, in international law, to the particular understanding of
the bilateral compact and associated state relationship expressed before
the United Nations orally and in writing. It may not, again as a matter
of international law, invoke its domestic law to vitiate, or justify its failure to comply with, any consequent obligations.179
But as a matter of domestic law and ordinary canons of statutory
interpretation, it is difficult to read Public Laws 600 and 447 to vitiate
176 See, e.g., Nov. 3 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 14, at 802.
177 See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 573–74 (Dec. 22);
Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267–69 (Dec. 20); Arbitral Award Made by the
King of Spain on December 23, 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 213–14 (Nov. 18);
Legal Status of South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A/B) No. 53, at 22 (May 11).
178 See G.A. Res. 748, supra note 15.
179 See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 3, G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Annex (Dec. 12, 2001); see also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law 34–35 (6th ed. 2003); James Crawford, The International Law
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries 61, 61 (2002) (“The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful
is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.”); id. at 86–90 (collecting cases and other
authorities); cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 46(1), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a
rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.”).
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Congress’s otherwise plenary power over Puerto Rico under the Territories Clause.180 Apart from the textual analysis supplied above, where,
as here, serious doubts exist about the constitutionality of a binding,
irrevocable bilateral agreement with the inhabitants of a federal territory, the canon of constitutional avoidance counsels against interpreting an ambiguous statute to raise constitutional problems and toward,
in this case, an interpretation that leaves Congress’s power over Puerto
Rico intact.181 Furthermore, at the time (and certainly since), other
members of Congress, executive officers, and official documents disavowed the view that Public Law 600 vitiated Congress’s theretofore
plenary power over Puerto Rico under the Territories Clause. Outside
the U.N. context, many officials maintained that Public Law 600 did
not effect any revolutionary change in federal power over Puerto
Rico.182 Within the executive branch, for example, Irwin W. Silverman,
Chief Counsel of the Office of Territories of the Department of the Interior, remarked that although

180 See Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327; Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L.
No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319.
181 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (reiterating “the rule, repeatedly affirmed, that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions
are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
canon is often traced to Justice Brandeis’s famous concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Authority. See 297 U.S. 288, 341, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“‘When the
validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’” (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))). But others trace its origins to the early
nineteenth century and, in particular, the distinct avoidance canon derived from Chief
Justice Marshall’s statement in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that “an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.” See 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional
Questions As a Three-Branch Problem, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 831, 837 & n.23 (2001) (describing
Schooner Charming Betsy as “the case that many view as containing the germs of the avoidance canon” and collecting authorities); Sanford G. Hooper, Note, Judicial Minimalism and
the National Dialogue on Immigration: The Constitutional Avoidance Doctrine in Zadvydas v.
Davis, 59 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 975, 984 (2002) (“Although legal scholars typically regard
the Ashwander and Crowell opinions as the foundational cases of the avoidance doctrine,
the notion that courts should sidestep constitutional questions when possible can be
traced back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy.”)
(footnote omitted). If this pedigree is accurate, there is considerable irony in the fact that,
as applied to Public Law 600, the two canons would apparently yield contrary conclusions.
182 See Eduardo Guzmán, Comment, Igartúa De La Rosa v. United States: The Right of
the United States Citizens of Puerto Rico to Vote for the President and the Need to Re-evaluate America’s Territorial Policy, 4 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 141, 158 n.73 (2001) (collecting statements).
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[i]t is our hope and it is the hope of Government, I think, not
to interfere with that relationship [between the United States
and Puerto Rico established by Public Law 600 and subsequent events] but nevertheless the basic power inherent in the Congress of the United States, which no one can take away, is in the Congress as provided for in article IV, section 3 of the Constitution . . .
The Congress of the United States has the inherent power
under the Constitution to annul any law in any of our Territories . . . .183
A proposed amendment to Public Law 600, which would have
clarified that it did not modify Congress’s plenary power over Puerto
Rico, “was attacked and rejected but it is not clear whether it was opposed for technical reasons or because it was thought unnecessary. No
one, however, opposed it because he said Congress was making an irrevocable delegation of its constitutional power over territories.”184
E. International Law and the Compact
Scholar Arnold H. Leibowitz suggests that one plausible reading of
the phrase “in the nature of a compact” is that, as a factual matter, the
drafting and adoption of Puerto Rico’s constitution would necessarily
involve a bilateral process that “required Puerto Rican support.”185 Public Law 600 envisioned a referendum on the statute itself, a constitutional convention, the drafting of a new constitution, and ultimately
one or more votes on the final text.186 All of these steps would necessitate cooperation on the part of the people of Puerto Rico. The phrase
“in the nature of a compact” may, in other words, be an expression with
political rather than strictly legal significance.187 Liebowitz’s conclusion
is non-trivial. For in the final analysis, we believe, the conclusion that
Public Law 600 created a legal compact in domestic law is not strictly
necessary to determine whether, at present, Puerto Rico enjoys the degree and kind of self-government envisioned by the compact and that
suffices to qualify it as a genuine associated state. Nor is that conclusion
183 Approving Puerto Rican Constitution: Hearings on S.J. Res. 151 Before the S.
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 82nd Cong. (1952) (statement of Irwin W.
Silverman, Chief Counsel of the Office of Territories, Department of the Interior), quoted
in Leibowitz, supra note 43, at 167 (emphasis added).
184 Id. at 169.
185 Id. at 173–74.
186 Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, §2, 64 Stat. 319, 319.
187 See Leibowitz, supra note 43, at 173–74.
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necessary to decide whether the United States has discharged its international decolonization obligations toward Puerto Rico.188
Whatever the theoretical scope of Congress’s power to regulate
Puerto Rican affairs, the fact remains that, in practice, since 1952 Congress has generally allowed Puerto Ricans to govern themselves substantially as the two parties had contemplated at the time. That is, the actual division of powers between Puerto Rico and the United States—
even if the partial legal autonomy of Puerto Rico is a fiction in domestic
law and, constitutionally, it remains a territory subject to Congress’s
plenary power—largely conforms to the terms agreed upon in 1952.189
The instruments that govern the de facto present relationship and division of competences between the United States and Puerto Rico include the Constitution, the PRFRA, the Puerto Rican Constitution, and
Public Law 600.190 Within the convoluted legal regime enacted by the
interplay of these instruments, Puerto Rico exercises considerable selfgovernance, even if only because Congress seldom has an interest in
intervening in its local affairs.191 Yet what matters is that the United
States has not, to date, interfered with Puerto Rico’s de facto status as a
locally self-governing associated state functioning, essentially as envisioned, pursuant to its constitution and within the general terms of the
compact created, affirmed, and communicated internationally from
1952 to 1953.
International law does not, as a rule, inquire into the internal laws
of States; it asks only whether, in substance, a State has met its international legal obligations.192 That is why, for example, in the recent ICJ
decisions on U.S. obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations193 relating to detained foreign nationals allegedly denied the right to consular assistance, the ICJ has consistently
188 As we will see, however, the status and correct interpretation of Public Law 600,
“adopted in the nature of a compact,” may be relevant for other purposes. See Act of July 3,
1950, § 1, 64 Stat. at 319.
189 See Reisman, supra note 71, at 35–37.
190 See id. at 35.
191 See Leibowitz, supra note 43, at 185–227 (offering a comprehensive overview of the
application of these instruments to Puerto Rico).
192 See 1 Oppenheim’s International Law § 21 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992). This axiom no longer holds categorically in contemporary international law
because of the advent of, among other things, international human rights law, certain
international investment law treaties, and other developments that now allow, or even
require, international appraisal of matters that would once have been regarded as “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.” See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
193 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261.
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stressed that the means by which the remedial obligation of “review and
reconsideration” of criminal judgments against foreign nationals
should be implemented “must be left to the United States.”194 More
generally, as the Permanent Court of International Justice famously put
it, “From the standpoint of International Law . . . municipal laws are
merely facts which express the will and constitute the activities of States,
in the same manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures.”195 Municipal laws generally constitute one of (often) several facts
to be appraised in context to determine whether a State has complied
with its international legal obligations.196 Oppenheim’s International Law
summarizes the principle well:
From the standpoint of international law states are generally
free as to the manner in which, domestically, they put themselves in the position to meet their international obligations;
the choice between the direct reception and application of international law, or its transformation into national law by way
of statute, is a matter of indifference, as is the choice between
the various forms of legislation, common law, or administrative action as the means for giving effect to international obligations. These are matters for each state to determine for itself according to its own constitutional practices.197
On the one hand, this means that States may not invoke their internal laws, even mandates of a constitutional nature, to defeat or to
justify a failure to comply with international legal obligations.198 On the
194 LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 513–14 ¶ 125 ( June 27); accord Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 62–64 (Mar. 31) (affirming the
same remedy, to be carried out by the United States “by means of its own choosing”).
195 Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 7, at 19 (May 25).
196 See 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 192, § 21, at 83. The lexicon of
international law generally uses the adjectives municipal, national, internal, domestic, and
local synonymously to refer to the laws of nation-States or countries in contradistinction to
international law.
197 Id. § 21, at 82–83. At the same time, Sir Arthur Watts and Sir Robert Jennings, the
editors of the most recent edition, point out that some uncertainty exists “about the extent
to which a state is in international law obliged to have laws enabling it to fulfil its international obligations” or, in contrast, “whether what matters is action actually taken in pursuance of the law.” Id. § 21, at 85. The answer, they suggest, depends on context, and where,
as here, the legal obligation requires the state “to perform or refrain from certain acts, . . .
it is actual conduct which determines compliance with a state’s international obligations
rather than the terms of the legislation, if any, which a state has enacted.” Id. § 21, at 85–
86.
198 See id. § 21, at 82–83.
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other, it leaves States at liberty to carry out their international obligations by whatever means best suit their legal or sociopolitical circumstances.199 No principle of international law requires that compliance
be achieved by obligations of a legal as opposed to a “merely” political
nature. Indeed, international lawyers appreciate that, at times, political
commitments offer more reliable indicia of intent to comply with a particular obligation than the formal trappings of domestic legislation.
So the fact (if it is a fact) that Congress might have done more
based on its asserted plenary authority under the Constitution, or that
it might exercise that power to do more in the future in a way that conflicts with the autonomy of Puerto Rico, does not necessarily vitiate U.S.
compliance with its postwar decolonization obligations or its internationally binding representations to the United Nations in 1953—on the
basis of which the General Assembly issued Resolution 748.200 From the
detached standpoint of international law, Puerto Rico indeed displays
“attributes of political sovereignty which clearly identify the status of
self-government attained by the Puerto Rican people as that of an
autonomous political entity.”201
In particular, recall that, according to the G.A. Resolution 567 of
1952, to determine whether a political entity qualifies as an associated
state by virtue of a bilateral arrangement, three factors should be taken
into account (though no one of these factors is determinative):“(i)
whether the constitutional guarantees extend equally to the associated
territory, (ii) whether there are constitutional fields reserved to the territory, and (iii) whether there is provision for the participation of the
territory on a basis of equality in any changes in the constitutional system of the State.”202
U.S. practice, in substance if not form, toward Puerto Rico manifestly satisfies the second condition: Puerto Rico enjoys virtually complete autonomy over its local affairs.203 The first and third conditions, at
least at first blush, may seem more problematic.204
199 See id.
200 See G.A. Res. 748, supra note 15, at 26 ¶ 5.
201 See id.; see also Reisman, supra note 71, at 42–50. On November 30, 1992, President
George H.W. Bush directed “all Federal departments, agencies, and officials to treat
Puerto Rico administratively as if it were a State insofar as doing so would not disrupt Federal programs or operations.” Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s
Status, supra note 109, at 2. The order remains in effect unless superseded by legislation.
Id.
202 G.A. Res. 567, supra note 76, at 62.
203 See id.
204 See id.
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As to the first, recall that under the Insular Cases doctrine, the
peoples of so-called unincorporated territories, which, according to the
federal government, Puerto Rico remains,205 may be denied the full
panoply of rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by citizens and
the inhabitants of incorporated territories—even though Puerto Ricans, by statute, technically qualify as citizens.206 Hence the bizarre state
of affairs, which persists today, that resident aliens physically located
within a state of the United States may enjoy greater benefits and rights
under federal law than Puerto Ricans citizens of the United States. Yet
those same citizens, simply by exercising their right to relocate to one
of the several states, can acquire “every right of any other citizen of the
United States, civil, social and political.”207 On Puerto Rican soil, however, they remain second-class citizens. In 1980 in Harris v. Rosario, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that Congress may discriminate against Puerto Ricans in administering the federal Aid to
Families with Dependent Children Program.208 In 1978 in Califano v.
Torres, the Court had reached a comparable conclusion relative to social security benefits.209 Professor David Helfeld argues on this basis
that, in theory,
it is difficult to imagine any law assigning federal funds discriminatorily against Puerto Rico which would not be considered rational. . . . After Harris Congress is on notice that under the territorial clause it has discretion to exclude totally, or
to apply partially to Puerto Rico any program based on federal funds, without violating the principle of the equal protection of the laws.210
Yet General Assembly Resolution 567 does not purport to require
complete equality in constitutional guarantees; it is only one factor that
205 See, e.g., United States-Puerto Rico Political Status Act, H.R. 856, 105th Cong. § 2(4)
(1998).
206 See Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
207 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 308; see also Leibowitz, supra note 142, at 244–45.
208 446 U.S. 651, 651–52 (1980).
209 435 U.S. 1, 2–4 (1978) (per curiam). Congress justified this decision based on (1)
Puerto Rico’s “unique tax status” insofar as it does not contribute to the federal treasury;
(2) the expense of including Puerto Rico in the federal program at issue; and (3) and the
potential disruption to Puerto Rico’s economy. Id. at 5 n.7; accord Harris, 446 U.S. at 651–
52; see also Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 468–69 (1979) (affirming the continuing
vitality of The Insular Cases doctrine relative to Puerto Rico).
210 David M. Helfeld, How Much of the United States Constitution and Statutes Are Applicable
to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico?, 110 F.R.D. 449, 462 (1986).

40

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 50:1

enters into the determination of associated statehood.211 And although
Congress may be “on notice” of its theoretical powers, it has not chosen
to exercise them in ways contrary to the figurative “terms” of the bilateral compact entered into, as a matter of international law, in 1952.212
In practice, whatever the theoretical scope of congressional power over
Puerto Rico under the Territories Clause and the Insular Cases doctrine,
the United States has in fact vested Puerto Ricans with (or recognized
judicially) virtually the same constitutional rights and privileges enjoyed
by citizens of the several states. The consistent trend since 1952, even if
only as a matter of policy, has been to expand this category. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that due process and equal protection apply to Puerto Ricans, although it has—probably deliberately—
declined to specify whether these constitutional principles apply by virtue of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.213 It has also, at least in
dicta, extended to Puerto Ricans the right to travel and protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.214 Puerto Ricans may bring,
and have brought, civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.215 As a
general rule, Helfeld’s remark that “if a state can do it constitutionally,
Puerto Rico can do it, and vice versa” accurately captures the constitutional jurisprudence to date.216 In short, then, even if Congress remains
211 See G.A. Res. 567, supra note 76, at 62.
212 See Helfeld, supra note 210, at 462.
213 See Calero-Toldeo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 668–69 n.5 (1974)
(due process); Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426
U.S. 572, 601 (1976) (striking down, as a violation of equal protection, alienage restrictions on civil engineers residing in Puerto Rico and again declining to say “whether it is
the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth which provides the protection”). Professor
Helfeld speculates, plausibly, “that the Court wished to avoid the implications of grounding its decision on either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments” because “[i]f it had relied
on the former, it might have given the impression that Puerto Rico continues to be a territory,” whereas, had it relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, “that could have been interpreted as the equivalent of defining Puerto Rico as a state of the union.” Helfeld, supra
note 210, at 456.
214 Califano, 435 U.S. at 4 n.6 (assuming without deciding that the constitutional right
to travel extends to the Commonwealth); Torres, 442 U.S. at 471 (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to Puerto Rico, preempting local Puerto Rican legislation that would
have permitted the challenged search, although once again eliding the question of
“whether the Fourth Amendment applies to Puerto Rico directly or by operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment”).
215 See Helfeld, supra note 210, at 471 & nn.82–87.
216 Id. at 457. In fact, the sole “fundamental” right that still “remains in doubt,” based
on the archaic decision in Balzac, “is trial by jury in criminal cases.” Helfeld, supra note
210, at 457–58. Yet Puerto Rico guarantees that right by local legislation in any event, obviating the need for the Supreme Court to rule on it. See id. at 458 & n.24; Aleinikoff, supra
note 18, at 83.
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theoretically empowered to modify or eliminate the rights and privileges of Puerto Ricans with the stroke of a pen, current U.S. practice,
we conclude, satisfies Resolution 567’s directive to ensure that sufficient
“constitutional guarantees extend equally to the associated territory.”217
The third condition set forth in Resolution 567, “whether there is
provision for the participation of the territory on a basis of equality in
any changes in the constitutional system of the State,” poses a greater
challenge.218 Puerto Ricans, even though technically citizens, lack a
vote in federal elections (so long as they reside in Puerto Rico);219 only
a non-voting observer in Congress represents their interests.220 This is
because the federal Constitution vests the right to vote in electors, not
citizens, and it inextricably ties voting rights to the several states, and
yet Puerto Rico is clearly not a state.221 Under the ICCPR, this constitutional scheme may well pose a problem, as we will later discuss.222 But in
terms of associated statehood, it is not clear that the absence of the
franchise per se constitutes a violation of U.S. international obligations
under the 1952 bilateral compact.
Associated statehood, by definition, manifests a relationship of
inequality: it is flexible enough to accommodate a broad range or spectrum of relationships of unequal power between principal and associate.223 The international legality of a particular associated state, such as
Puerto Rico, depends in part on the consent of the associate’s population.224 There can be little question that the people of Puerto Rico con217 G.A. Res. 567, supra note 76, at 62.
218 See id.
219 See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 308, 312 (affirming that even though Puerto Ricans enjoy
only “fundamental” rights while domiciled in Puerto Rico, should they “move into the
continental United States,” as citizens, they would “enjoy every right of any other citizen of
the United States, civil, social and political”).
220 See 48 U.S.C. § 891 (2006).
221 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators
and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States,
shall be appointed an Elector.”); see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several
States . . . .”); id. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . .”).
222 See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25.
223 See Reisman, supra note 71, at 10; Keitner & Reisman, supra note 84, at 51; see also
id. at 63 (depicting the spectrum of potential associated state arrangements in terms of the
nature and kind of reserved sovereign competences).
224 See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 56, at 29, Annex, Principle VII (“Free association
should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes.”).
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sented to the degree (or lack thereof) of participation in the federal
government of the United States.225 In 1953, Governor Luis Muñoz
Marín confirmed in his letter to President Eisenhower that the Commonwealth relationship “reflects our own decision as to the type of institutions and the kind of relationship to the United States which we
desire.”226 The people of Puerto Rico deliberately chose not to become
a state, which would have entailed federal voting rights and effective
participation in Congress, mainly because of the socioeconomic circumstances of the island. U.S. Representative to the General Assembly
Frances Bolton noted, for example, that Puerto Rico and the United
States sought “to create such relationships as would insure for the people of Puerto Rico the best opportunities to develop socially, economically, and culturally, taking into consideration their geographic and
demographic circumstances.”227 She later addressed precisely the concern that Puerto Rico would retain only a non-voting resident commissioner in the House of Representatives:
This, Mr. Chairman, cannot be regarded as painful to the
people of Puerto Rico. Under the U.S. Constitution, Puerto
Rico could obtain full legislative representation in the U.S.
Congress only if it were a State . . . . In that case however the
people of Puerto Rico would lose the fiscal advantages which
they now enjoy . . . . These arrangements constitute substantial advantages of particular benefit to an area such as Puerto
Rico whose natural economic resources are so limited. The
admission into the Union under the terms of the Constitution
would entail the loss of these advantages. The taxpayers of
Puerto Rico would have to contribute over 100 million dollars
annually to the U.S. Treasury, a sum which represents 10 percent of the national income of Puerto Rico and nearly 60 percent of its budget. For this reason the majority of the people
225 But see José Trías Monge, Injustice According to Law: The Insular Cases and Other Oddities, in Foreign in a Domestic Sense, supra note 44, at 226, 233 (arguing that Puerto Rico’s consent is overbroad and therefore invalid and that the status quo “clearly does not
meet the decolonization standards set by the United Nations in 1960”); cf. Jon M. Van
Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. Haw. L. Rev. 445, 504 (1992) (arguing, relative to the CNMI, that even had its
people “knowingly sought . . . subservient status, it would not comply with the requirements of international law, just as a contract in which a person agrees to become a slave of
another would not be enforced in a domestic court” and that “[o]nly if a people truly have
the right to enact the laws that apply to them can it be said that they are self-governing”).
226 Letter from Luis Muñoz Marin, supra note 42, at 589.
227 Nov. 3 Statement by Frances Bolton, supra note 14, at 803.
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of Puerto Rico prefer Commonwealth status, albeit it does not
provide for full legislative representation in Congress, to
statehood . . . . They have expressed this preference emphatically [in multiple referenda].228
Puerto Rico’s representative, Dr. Fernós-Isern, clearly appreciated
this, and in substantial part, it drove Puerto Rico’s decision to forego
both statehood and independence in favor of the intermediate status of
associated statehood.229
In short, despite Puerto Rico’s virtual lack of participation or representation in a federal government that purports to exercise plenary
power over it, we think it is wrong to describe Puerto Rico, as some do,
as a colony in the international legal sense.230 That could, as we have
stressed, change in the future should Congress or a future administration adopt a different attitude toward Puerto Rico. But we see no reason, at present, to anticipate this. To the contrary, recent U.S. legislative
and executive activity indicate a continuing solicitude for the people of
Puerto Rico and a willingness, in the same spirit as President Eisenhower conveyed to the United Nations nearly sixty years ago, to accede
to the Puerto Rican people’s request should they desire independence
or a different status.231
228 Id. at 804.
229 See Oct. 30 Statement by Antonio Fernós-Isern, supra note 141, at 801 (“Thus the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, its citizens free from taxes payable to the Federal Treasury,
receiving cooperation from the U.S. Government for social, economic, and educational
purposes, without any limitation placed upon its autonomy, can make use of all of its resources for social, economic, and cultural development programs, in accordance with its
own policies and on the basis of its own philosophy of government.”).
230 Contra Pedro A. Malavet, America’s Colony: The Political and Cultural
Conflict Between the United States and Puerto Rico 2–4 (2004) (describing Puerto
Rico as a “colony” of the United States, where colony is defined as “a polity with a definable territory that lacks legal and political sovereignty because that authority is exercised
by a people other than the inhabitants of the colony”); Trías Monge, supra note 151, at
177–96 (surveying possible legal methods for “decolonizing” Puerto Rico); Rafael
Hernández Colón, Doing Right by Puerto Rico, 77 Foreign Aff. 112, 113 (1998) (observing,
as a former governor of Puerto Rico, that many find the current compact undemocratic,
“branding it the worst form of colonialism”). This is not to suggest that characterizing
Puerto Rico as a colony is necessarily incorrect from a sociopolitical perspective. See, e.g.,
José A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Out of the Colonial Closet, 33 Foreign Pol’y 66, 68–69 (1979)
(“[N]o word other than ‘colonialism’ adequately describes the relationship between a
powerful metropolitan state and an impoverished overseas dependency, disenfranchised
from the formal lawmaking processes that shape its people’s daily lives.”).
231 See Nov. 27 Statement by Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., supra note 154, at 841 (conveying
this message on behalf of and with the authorization of President Eisenhower). More recent expressions convey a similar message. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Self-Determination Act of
2006, S. 2304, 109th Cong., 2d Sess. (2006) (authorizing a constitutional convention for
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At present, the most difficult legal questions surrounding Puerto
Rico’s current status may well be more domestic than international in
the strict sense. Two questions, in particular, invite analysis in our view.
First, does the Constitution permit the kind and nature of selfgovernance institutions established in 1952 and that, we believe, presently qualify Puerto Rico as a genuine associated state? Second, do
Puerto Ricans have a sufficient voice in their future destiny to satisfy
modern international norms on democracy even though they lack the
franchise, especially after the United States ratified the ICCPR and assumed an explicit treaty obligation to extend the franchise to “[e]very
citizen”?232 We now turn to these questions.
III. Can the Constitution Accommodate Associated Statehood?
A. The Appointments Clause
As a matter of international law, Puerto Rico qualifies as an associated state rather than a colony because it exercises substantially the nature and degree of local autonomy and self-governance agreed upon in
1952—even if, in domestic law, this may well be only a precarious state
of affairs brought about by “benign neglect” of a sort.233 Still, it exercises this autonomy through a local Puerto Rican government elected
pursuant to the Puerto Rican constitution. That government has competence over local matters more or less to the same extent as does any
U.S. state, and it operates without significant interference or direction
from the United States. It has largely escaped notice that this arrangement may violate the Appointments Clause.234
the purpose of proposing to Congress “(1) a new or amended compact of association”;
“(2) the admission of the Commonwealth as a State in the United States; or (3) the declaration of the Commonwealth as an independent country”); Report by the President’s
Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status, supra note 109, at 10–11 (outlining recommendations for a two-stage plebiscite based on the principle that “[t]he democratic will of the
Puerto Rican people is paramount for determining the future status of the territory”); see
also, e.g., H.R. 856, 105th Cong. (1998).
232 See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25. The Constitution, as noted, gives voting rights to
electors rather than citizens as such, and it ties congressional representation to statehood.
See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. Professor Gerald Neuman characterizes this
state of affairs as a “fundamental republican defect” insofar as “the Constitution restricts
national representation to the states while giving the national organs governing power
over the territories.” Neuman, supra note 44, at 196–97.
233 See Reisman, supra note 71, at 35–37.
234 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. To the best of our knowledge, this potential issue
has been raised or hinted at in only two places in the existing literature on Puerto Rico.
The first is an undeveloped, almost casual comment by the Department of Justice object-
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The Appointments Clause states that the President
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.235
If a person qualifies as an “Officer[] of the United States” within
the meaning of this clause, then, by its terms, the clause allows only
four appointing authorities.236 For non-inferior (or principal) officers,
the sole proper appointing authority is the President, acting with the
Senate’s advice and consent.237 For inferior officers, Congress may, by
statute, authorize appointment by the President alone, by an executive
department head, or by a court of law, or it may leave in place the default mode of presidential nomination and Senate confirmation.238
For purposes of this Article, the distinction between principal and
inferior officers is immaterial.239 Assuming officials of the Puerto Rican
government fall within the terms of the Appointments Clause as either
principal or inferior officers, the Constitution does not authorize their
ing to a statutory provision granting to the Puerto Rican governor the power to force reconsideration of federal regulations. See Political Status of Puerto Rico: Hearings on S. 244
Before the Sen. Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 102nd Cong. 190 (1991) (statement of
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh) (quoted in T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and
the Constitution: Conundrums and Prospects, 11 Const. Comment. 15, 36 n.85 (1994) (noting
that in comments attached to Thornburgh’s testimony the Department argued that such
action constituted “significant governmental authority under the laws of the United
States,” as defined by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, and therefore could only be
carried out by a federal official appointed under the Appointments Clause)). The second
is an article by one of the present authors. See Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the
Limits of Formalism, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 853, 866–70 (1990). Professor Lawson was cued to the
problem in 1985 by Herman Marcuse, then an attorney-adviser in the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Department of Justice, although he does not believe that Mr. Marcuse ever
pursued the issue in writing (and he has no reason to believe that Mr. Marcuse would have
approved or disapproved of the direction of Professor Lawson’s further research into the
problem).
235 U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 For a detailed treatment of that question, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson,
The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions: A Textualist Response to
Justice Scalia, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1002, 1016–21 (2007).
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election by the people of Puerto Rico. The sole relevant question is
therefore whether Puerto Rican officials qualify as “Officers of the
United States” within the meaning of Article II. If they do, Puerto
Rico’s government, as presently structured, is unconstitutional. Furthermore, there is no easy fix: any Puerto Rican government not staffed
by federal appointees would be equally unconstitutional.240
Professor Lawson has elsewhere endorsed this argument.241 Professor Sloane, as detailed below, does not. We both, however, believe it
imperative to develop valid constitutional solutions that can command
universal (or nearly so) assent to enable the people of Puerto Rico to
exercise self-governance rights in conformity with the past exercise of
their right to self-determination, in which they unambiguously selected
associated statehood rather than either integration or independence.
Accordingly, to stimulate discussion of this important issue, we try to
present, in point-counterpoint fashion, arguments for and against the
proposition that the Constitution’s structural requirements stand in the
way of compliance with the demands of international law, as well as
sound governance policy.
Professor Lawson’s argument for the unconstitutionality of elected
territorial governments begins, and to a large extent ends, with the text
of the Appointments Clause.242 The Constitution does not specifically
define the category “Officers of the United States” that is the subject of
the Appointments Clause. But without generating much comment or
controversy, the Supreme Court has said, in its 1976 decision in Buckley
v. Valeo, that this designation includes “any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States.”243 The gover240 In Professor Lawson’s view, self-government in any territory would be unconstitutional.
241 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 129–36; Lawson, supra note 234, at 866–
70, 894–900.
242 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
243 See 424 U.S. 1, 125–26, 140–43 (1976) (per curiam) (examining the meaning of the
term “Officers of the United States” as used in the Appointments Clause in the context of
members appointed to the Federal Election Commission). Although Buckley’s definition of
an officer refers specifically only to “appointee[s],” that does not imply that anyone whose
selection results from election rather than appointment lies categorically outside the scope
of the Appointments Clause. See id. at 125–26. Congress cannot evade the Appointments
Clause by stipulating that the Secretary of State shall be selected through a national plebiscite. Cf. Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (holding that the legislature of the Phillippine Islands could not provide for legislative appointment to executive
agencies). The Court in Buckley used the term “appointee” because, in the context of the
Federal Election Commission, the Court specifically faced the issue of extraconstitutional
modes of appointment rather the mode of election. See 424 U.S. at 125–26, 140–43. The
central point of Buckley is that substance rather than form determines the content of the
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nor and members of the Puerto Rican legislature certainly exercise significant federal authority under the constitution adopted under the
authority of Public Law 600.244 This seems to qualify them prima facie
as officers of the United States.
But this answer—though, in Professor Lawson’s view, ultimately
correct—is far too simple when put so starkly. Not every person who
takes significant action pursuant to a federal statute is necessarily an
“Officer[] of the United States” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause. If another country chose to incorporate U.S. law into its
own law, officials in that country would not need presidential appointments in order to enforce that incorporated U.S. law. They would be
acting pursuant to their own independently-derived domestic legal authority rather than U.S. federal authorization, even if the underlying
substantive law that they enforced had federal origins—just as foreign
courts often apply and administer U.S. law in the course of their duties
without thereby becoming federal courts subject to Article III or the
Appointments Clause.
Even more to the point, state officials enforce federal law—and
have done so since the time of the founding—even though they have
not been appointed by any method specified in the Appointments
Clause.245 The reason that state officials do not require federal appointment to enforce federal law is that their own states provide that
authority. That is, their authority to enforce federal law, which the Constitution makes not merely applicable but supremely applicable within the
states, does not derive from federal law itself; it derives from their powers as states of the Union.246 It therefore need not conform to the constitutional requirements for federal officials—just as state courts may
(and normally must) adjudicate cases involving federal law when it is
part of their background jurisdiction but do not, for that reason, become federal courts within the meaning of Article III. If Congress does
not want state officials to enforce a particular federal law, it can provide
for exclusive federal enforcement, but Congress enacts federal laws
against the background of independent state enforcement authority.
constitutional category “Officer of the United States”: anyone who exercises significant
federal authority solely by virtue of federal law must be appointed in conformance with the
Appointments Clause. See id. at 126.
244 See Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319.
245 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1957, 2006
(1993) (“The Constitution does not need a provision declaring that state executives must
enforce federal law; state executive officers must enforce federal law because of the very
nature of their office.”).
246 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

48

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 50:1

The interesting constitutional questions concern whether Congress can
compel state officials to enforce federal law when the state’s own law says
otherwise,247 but those questions turn principally on the power of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause248 rather than on the requirements of the Appointments Clause.249
To some extent, of course, state officials in every state other than
the original thirteen exercise all of their authority pursuant to a federal
statute, if only because at some point in time a federal statute necessarily brought those states into existence by admitting them to the Union.250 Nonetheless, once a state exists, it no longer depends on a federal statute for its authority. State officials then draw their power from a
source independent of federal law. Congress can provide for exclusive
federal enforcement of a statute whenever it is “necessary and proper
for carrying into Execution” federal law, but Congress cannot abolish a
state government. So once a state is up and running as a state, its officials no longer exercise their power pursuant to a federal statute. To
the extent that the execution of federal law is part of their duties as
state officials, they may exercise that authority, barring federal preemption, without worrying about the Appointments Clause.251
Private citizens, too, often enforce federal law in a very real sense
through private rights of action, even though, again, they have not
been appointed in conformity with the Appointments Clause.252 To explore the issues raised by private enforcement of federal law would require a separate article;253 here, suffice it to say that as long as private

247 Scholars have argued that, as an original matter (and more or less coincidentally as
a doctrinal matter), the answer is “no” with respect to state legislative and executive officials but “yes” with respect to state judicial officials. See Calabresi & Lawson, supra note 239,
at 1025–34; Gary Lawson, A Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment in Constitutional Context, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 469, 496–98 (2008).
248 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
249 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. On reflection, Professor Lawson thinks there is a
case to be made that if a state official’s only source of enforcement authority is a federal
statute because the official’s own state law denies him or her that authority, then the Appointments Clause may apply, but this point is beyond the scope of this article.
250 See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New States may be admitted by the Congress into
this Union”).
251 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
252 See id.
253 Several authors have explored the applicability of the Appointments Clause to
nongovernmental actors. See generally Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to NonFederal Actors, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 331 (1998); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85
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citizens genuinely act to vindicate their own rights rather than (as they
arguably do, for example, in qui tam litigation) as surrogate lawenforcers, they do not act as “Officers of the United States” in the constitutional sense.254
Where in this scheme do the elected officials of the Puerto Rican
government fall? In Professor Lawson’s view, constitutionally, they can
only be considered federal officials. Puerto Rico, whatever the appropriate interpretation of Public Law 600, is not a foreign State; it does
not even consider itself one. The United States could not enter into a
treaty with Puerto Rico—except, of course, were it first to separate itself
from the United States by a future referendum, an option considered
below. Nor can Puerto Rican officials be deemed state officials. In the
referenda of the early 1950s, a majority of Puerto Ricans rejected even
the desire to become a state,255 and were Puerto Rico subsequently to
vote for statehood, the United States would need to agree to admit it to
the Union. Assuming that Puerto Rico remains a territory, it constitutes
a federal instrumentality.256 Of course, it may well be a federal instrumentality that differs in kind or quality from, say, the Federal Trade
Commission, but it is a federal instrumentality nonetheless. Under the
Constitution, there is simply nothing else for it to be.
It is also clear, on this reasoning, that at least the governor of
Puerto Rico is an officer of the United States within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause. It is unnecessary to determine just how far the
governor’s authority over federal law extends. Congress explicitly
charges the Governor of Guam, for example, with “the faithful execution of the laws of Guam and the laws of the United States applicable in
Guam,” and that directive unambiguously makes him or her an officer
within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.257 The Puerto Rican
Constitution and laws, however, say only that the Puerto Rican governor
“shall execute the laws and cause them to be executed.”258 Yet even if
that general reference to “the laws” does not include federal law applicable in Puerto Rico (although it would seem to), under the Puerto
Rican Constitution, Puerto Rico’s governor also “shall enjoy such other
Nw. U. L. Rev. 62, 84–93 (1990); Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui
Tam Actions, 99 Yale L.J. 341 (1989).
254 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
255 See Letter from Luis Muñoz Marin, supra note 42, at 588.
256 See Sakamoto v. Duty Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1286 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussion in the context of Guam).
257 See 48 U.S.C. § 1422 (2006) (emphasis added).
258 P.R. Const. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1; see also 3 L.P.R.A. § 1(5) (stating that the governor
“shall at all times faithfully execute the laws”).

50

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 50:1

powers and must perform such other duties as are devolved upon him
by the laws of the United States.”259 One such power “devolved upon
him by the laws of the United States” is the power conferred by the Extradition Act, which provides:
Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory
demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive
authority of any State, District, or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or
an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory,
charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from
whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District, or Territory to which such person has
fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the
executive authority making such demand, or the agent of
such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall
cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall
appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the
time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged.260
This statute authorizes the governor of Puerto Rico to demand
extradition.261 That ability to compel a state governor to extradite an
alleged criminal plainly constitutes “significant authority pursuant to
the laws of the United States.”262 Because the governor of Puerto Rico
exercises this and other substantial federal powers, there can be no
question within the terms of this argument that he must be appointed
in the manner prescribed by the Appointments Clause—as, indeed, was
every territorial governor in the United States before 1947.
It is even possible that all local Puerto Rican laws must be considered laws of the United States for constitutional purposes. In that event
not only the governor, but all Puerto Rican officials, including local legislators, consistently execute federal law and therefore must be appointed under Article II of the Constitution.263 Whether this is so depends upon the accuracy of the expansive interpretation of “the Laws
of the United States” offered by Chief Justice Marshall in 1824 in Osborn
259 See 3 L.P.R.A. § 1(15).
260 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2006).
261 See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 229–30 (1987).
262 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
263 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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v. Bank of the United States and the applicability of that interpretation to
the execution of laws by executive as well as judicial actors.264 If that is
the correct understanding of the scope of federal law, it would entail
that all territorial laws, whether enacted by Congress or a local legislature, constitute federal laws and must be executed by federal appointees.265
In sum, according to this argument, the Constitution forbids the
creation of elected territorial offices—at least that of the governor and
quite possibly those of the local legislature as well. And of course, if
Puerto Rico’s institutions of local self-governance violate the Constitution, there is an irreconcilable tension between the imperatives of contemporary international law and the eighteenth-century Constitution.
There are, however, a number of possible responses to this apparent
problem with territorial self-governance. We offer (without either of us
necessarily endorsing) several such responses here for consideration.
First, one might invoke precedent. Although no Supreme Court
case directly considers the constitutionality of elected territorial officials, ample precedent, running along two lines, could support the
proposition that the Appointments Clause need not apply to territories
in the same way that it applies elsewhere in the United States. We (and
here Professors Lawson and Sloane speak jointly) suspect, however,
that, to most minds, this proposed cure may seem worse than the disease, for the relevant precedents are not ones that should be lightly expanded even were one favorably inclined toward precedent.266
The first of these lines of precedent, which dates back nearly two
centuries, concerns territorial courts. It has long been settled that
courts in federal territories need not conform to the requirements of
Article III, and territorial judges therefore need not enjoy tenure during good behavior or guarantees against the diminishment of their salaries while in office.267 Precedent establishes, in other words, that the
264 See U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 1; 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818–28 (1824); see also
Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 905 (1824).
265 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 134–36 (offering the detailed argument to
this effect).
266 Professor Lawson is notoriously hostile to the use of precedent as a tool of constitutional interpretation, but the case against the territorial precedents discussed here is independent of these broader, idiosyncratic doubts. See generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional
Case Against Precedent, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 23 (1994); Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 Ave Maria L. Rev. 1 (2007).
267 The doctrine dates at least from American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 511 (1828), and was roundly reaffirmed in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389,
402–03 (1973).
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Constitution’s structural assurances of federal judicial independence
do not apply to judicial officers in the territories. If the Constitution’s
structural provisions for Article III federal judges do not apply in the
territories, then, arguably, neither does (or should) the Constitution’s
structural provisions for federal executive officers.
Professor Lawson has elsewhere argued at length against the view
that territorial judges need not conform to the requirements of Article
III,268 and in this regard he finds himself uncharacteristically in the
scholarly mainstream, which has been witheringly critical of the territorial courts doctrine.269 Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this
study, and we do not mean to dismiss cavalierly all of the arguments in
favor of non-Article III territorial courts—nor the concomitant extension of that doctrine to territorial executives.270 State judges, for example, need not (and often do not) possess the guarantees of judicial independence required by Article III.271 The Supreme Court has roundly
rejected the idea that the absence of these guarantees violates due
process.272 There is nothing intrinsic in the judicial enterprise that requires the guarantees of independence supplied by Article III. Yet the
Article III model of federal judicial independence has wide normative
appeal,273 and the cases rejecting it in the territorial context are, at best,
obscurely reasoned. One should hesitate before extending these
precedents into new territory (so to speak).274

268 See Lawson, supra note 234, at 878–93.
269 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation
of Judicial Power 36–39 (1980); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The
Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801–1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 646, 719 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 915,
972 (1988).
270 For a relatively rare defense of the territorial courts doctrine, see generally Christopher D. Man, Extradition and Article III: A Historical Examination of the “Judicial Power of the
United States,” 10 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 37 (2002).
271 See Currie, supra note 269, at 719.
272 See Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176–81 (1994) (finding the Due Process
Clause does not require that military judges must have a fixed term of office).
273 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Foundations of
American Constitutionalism, 116 Yale L.J. 139, 154–55 (2006).
274 Students of territorial governance know that the nondelegation doctrine has repeatedly been held not to apply to territorial governments. See Lawson & Seidman, supra
note 94, at 125–27. Professor Lawson believes that this outcome is correct because the
nondelegation doctrine is grounded in the Necessary and Proper Clause, which Congress
does not need to invoke in order to legislate for territories. See id. at 127–29. That limited
rationale does not, however, justify refusing to apply the Appointments Clause to the territories.
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A second line of precedent that might be invoked here is that of
The Insular Cases, the essential contours of which we described earlier.275
If Congress can legislate for Puerto Rico without regard to the Constitution’s tariff provisions—the specific holding of Downes v. Bidwell,276
the most important of The Insular Cases—and can legislate for unincorporated territories without regard to the Constitution’s guarantees of
jury trial,277 it is not a huge step to say that Congress can legislate for
Puerto Rico without regard to the Appointments Clause. Nonetheless,
for three reasons, neither of the authors believes that invoking The Insular Cases is an attractive response.
First, even the doctrine of The Insular Cases concedes that “fundamental” provisions of the Constitution apply to all federal territories
whether or not Congress chooses to extend them.278 It is hard to think
of provisions more “fundamental” than the Constitution’s core provisions for allocating governmental power, including, for example, the
lawmaking processes of Article I, Section 7, or the Constitution’s staffing provisions. Considering the sheer number of provisions devoted to
the subject, there may be no provisions more fundamental to the constitutional scheme than those that specify the processes for the selection of government officials.279
Second, regardless of how Puerto Rico looked in 1901 when The
Insular Cases were decided or in 1922,280 today, Puerto Rico seems to be
the paradigm of an incorporated territory as modern jurisprudence
understands that legal term of art.281 Even if Puerto Rico’s people never

275 See supra notes 117–126 and accompanying text.
276 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
277 See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304–05, 313(1922).
278 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 195.
279 The Constitution contains extensive provisions for the selection and qualifications
of the President and Vice President, see U.S Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2–6; id. amend. XII, XX,
XXII–XXIII & XXV; members of the House of Representatives, see id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2–4; id.
art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, the Senate, see id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1–3; id.
art. I, § 4, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; id. amend. XVII; and the federal electorate, see id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, 4; id. amends. XV, XVII,
XIX, XXIV & XXVI.
280 The latter year was marked by Balzac, which held that because of Puerto Rico’s
status as an unincorporated territory, Congress need not provide for the right to a jury
trial in Puerto Rico. 258 U.S. at 313.
281 If Puerto Rico is best viewed today as an incorporated territory under The Insular
Cases doctrine, does that mean that Puerto Rico’s people automatically, and not only by
statute, qualify as U.S. citizens by virtue of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment? See
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .”). The answer is
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seek statehood (and even if they do at some point, but Congress declines to grant it), there can be no question that Puerto Rico remains a
prime candidate for statehood, a territory that has the “potentialities of
statehood.”282 Under The Insular Cases, all constitutional provisions, and
not only those that have been deemed “fundamental,” apply to incorporated territories of their own force (ex proprio vigore). There is no obvious reason why this would not include the Appointments Clause.283
Finally, the potential invocation of The Insular Cases doctrine to justify the constitutionality of an elected territorial governor (and perhaps
legislature) is unappealing because those decisions remain a blight on
U.S. constitutional jurisprudence. In the first place, The Insular Cases rely
on two dubious and unjustified distinctions: first, between incorporated
and unincorporated territories, and second, between fundamental and
non-fundamental provisions of the Constitution. The plausibility of a
territory’s future statehood may, in Professor Lawson’s view, be relevant
in some circumstances to determining whether the United States has
the constitutional power to acquire that territory.284 But nowhere does
the Constitution suggest differing federal powers to govern territory
once it has been properly acquired. Nor does any provision suggest that
certain territories merit less constitutional protection because of, for
example, lack of geographic contiguity or cultural differences. And although it has become conventional—to the point of banality—in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence to distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental rights,285 that distinction is typically employed to expand the range of constitutional rights (that is, to include,
for example, unenumerated but fundamental rights), not to exclude
from cognizance rights that the text of the Constitution clearly creates
but that have nonetheless been somehow deemed “non-fundamental.”
The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental constitutional provisions makes even less sense when it is applied to structural provisions of the Constitution, such as the Appointments Clause,

quite possibly yes. See generally Lisa Maria Perez, Note, Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1029 (2008).
282 See Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 5 (1955); see also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 267 (1990).
283 Of course, there is also no obvious reason why such a doctrine would not make Article III’s judicial independence provisions applicable to incorporated territories, although
under current law it does not.
284 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 79–85.
285 See Paul Brest et al., Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases
and Materials 1339–1592, 1609–82 (5th ed. 2006).
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rather than rights.286 The Constitution’s structural provisions were designed to work as an integrated whole. The Appointments Clause reads
as it does at least in part because of the structure of the rest of Article
II: the division of Congress between the House of Representatives and
the Senate (and the different roles assigned to each body); the Constitution’s silence on the precise structure of the executive department
below the level of the President and Vice President; the implementational power granted to Congress in the Necessary and Proper
Clause;287 and so forth. That overall scheme of enumerated, separated,
and divided powers is the most vital feature of the Constitution. It is
neither meaningful nor principled to try to pick apart which specific
clauses, or parts of clauses, are and are not “fundamental” to that
scheme.288
From the standpoint of an originalist, such as Professor Lawson,
The Insular Cases are, as Judge Torruella has aptly put it, “a strict constructionist’s worst nightmare.”289 From the standpoint of one who
views the Constitution in more functional or normative terms, as does
Professor Sloane, The Insular Cases look even worse.290 They were transparently the product of an overtly racist ideology that viewed the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines as uncivilized—as
unworthy of receiving, and incapable of handling, governance according to constitutional norms.291 Furthermore, in the context of a study
of the interplay of international and constitutional law, it is worth not286 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
287 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
288 Would, for instance, the extension of The Insular Cases in this fashion mean that the
Presentment Clause also could be dispensed with when legislation concerns territories? See
id. § 7, cl. 2–3 (stating that every bill that has passed the House and Senate, and every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the House and Senate is necessary,
shall be presented to the President for approval).
289 See Torruella, supra note 120, at 306.
290 In Professor Sloane’s view, originalism, too, is a normative theory, at least in the
forms in which it is typically advanced. But see generally Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . .
and Constitutions, 85 Geo. L.J. 1823 (1997).
291 The racist origins of The Insular Cases are no secret. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note
18, at 29 (noting that in the cases the distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territories was deemed to turn on congressional intent “based largely on the race
and perceived level of civilization of the inhabitants” and that those territories “populated
by ‘barbarians’ not thought fit for full U.S. membership were found not to have been incorporated into the United States”); Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: Immigrants, Borders, and Fundamental Law 89 (1996) (noting “the frank racism
that informed the rationale of the Insular Cases”); see also Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 94
(“The Insular Cases, tainted by racial and religious intolerance, were bad law at the beginning of the twentieth century; they should not control the twenty-first.”).
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ing that The Insular Cases originated in substantial part in the (now utterly anachronistic) international law of the era, in particular, the presumptive “right of states to acquire uninhabited territories through discovery and occupation” and the concomitant “right of the acquiring
power to govern a territory as it saw fit.”292 If the price of saving the
status quo with Puerto Rico is the continued vitality or extension of The
Insular Cases, that price is too high.
Yet there are other potential ways to reconcile Puerto Rico’s international status as an associated state within the meaning of the compact
with the Appointments Clause, which Professor Sloane finds at least
plausible. Professor Lawson’s constitutional objection to an elected
Puerto Rican government presupposes that Puerto Rico remains a federal territory and that the “Constitution knows only the mutually exclusive categories of ‘State’ and ‘Territory.’”293 That is why, in his view, officers of the government of Puerto Rico—or, at a minimum, its governor—must be “Officers of the United States” within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause. Unlike state officials, they do not derive their
authority to apply federal law from a source independent of the federal
Constitution.
But if the events of 1952–53 indeed established Puerto Rico as an
associated state, and if the Constitution does not disable the United
States from entering into relationships of associated statehood,294 then
Puerto Rico’s officials derive their authority from a distinct source,
which is relevantly analogous to that of the several states. The Puerto
Rican constitution declares that its authority “emanates from the people and shall be exercised in accordance with their will, within the
terms of the compact agreed upon between the people of Puerto Rico
292 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 165
(2002) [hereinafter The Powers Inherent in Sovereignty]; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at
21–23 (noting that “the Court believed that the power to acquire and rule territory was an
inherent aspect of statehood in the nineteenth-century world”); Sarah H. Cleveland, The
Plenary Power Background of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1127, 1154 (1999); Cleveland, The Powers Inherent in Sovereignty, supra, at 165 (“The sovereign had discretion to govern territorial inhabitants either as subordinate colonies and subjects or to give them full
citizenship status, and to maintain the laws of the previous sovereign until altered by the
new power.”); Leibowitz, supra note 142, at 241.
293 Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 89–90 (characterizing Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh’s testimony before the Senate in 1991 regarding the constitutionality of an
“enhanced commonwealth” status for Puerto Rico).
294 Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (“[I]t is not lightly to be assumed
that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government’ is not to be found.” (quoting Andrews v. Andrews,
188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903))).
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and the United States of America,”295 much as the power of state officers to enforce federal law emanates from the people of the states, even
if subject to the Constitution, which itself originated in a kind of compact among those states. If that is right, Puerto Rican officials do not
qualify as federal officers within the meaning of the Appointments
Clause. The fact that it required an act of Congress to bring Puerto
Rico into existence as an associated state is of no more consequence,
on this view, than the fact that congressional statutes were necessary to
admit all states after the original thirteen.
Although Professor Lawson agrees that this argument has a great
deal of resonance as a matter of U.S. political theory, he doubts that it
offers a valid solution to the Appointments Clause issue he has identified.296 If Puerto Rico is in fact a distinct political entity whose people
may empower a government independent of the federal Constitution,
then Puerto Rico is an independent sovereign State—as, indeed, the
states of the Union would be but for the peculiar federal arrangement
spelled out in the Constitution itself. No doubt, under international
law, Puerto Rico has the right to opt for independence and thereby to
establish its own government.297 But it has not exercised that option,
and were it to decide to in the future, the relationship between Puerto
Rico and the United States would perforce change significantly.298 Until
that happens, however, Puerto Rico remains under the—and there is
no good euphemism for this—control of the United States. The Constitution leaves no wiggle room for a status of “not-quite-independence”
or “independence-in-some-respects-but-not-others.” The Constitution
recognizes, respectively, “the United States of America,”299 “the several
States,”300 “foreign Nations,”301 “Indian Tribes,”302 and finally, “Territory
295 P.R. Const. art. I, § 1.
296 See supra notes 242–292 and accompanying text.
297 See G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 56, at 29, Annex, Principle VI.
298 Congress would no longer have power under the Territories Clause (or any other
constitutional provision) to legislate for Puerto Rico. Nor would a “compact” or a statute
“in the nature of a compact” be a legitimate arrangement; agreement between the United
States and Puerto Rico would have to take the form of a treaty—or another international
agreement, such as a congressional-executive or sole executive agreement, although Professor Lawson, among others, believes these non-treaty practices violate the Constitution.
See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221 (1995). But see generally Oona
A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the
United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236 (2008).
299 U.S. Const. pmbl.
300 Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
301 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; id. art III, § 2, cl. 1 (“foreign States”).
302 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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or other Property belonging to the United States.”303 Political entities in
this latter category simply do not have a constitutionally independent
source of authority. As an early Supreme Court advocate said of territorial judges a quarter century before the Supreme Court ruled them
outside the bounds of Article III:
The executive power exercised within the district of Columbia
is the executive power of the United States. The legislative
power exercised in the district is the legislative power of the
United States.—And what reason can be given why the judicial power exercised in the district should not be the judicial
power of the United States? If it be not the judicial power of
the United States, of what nation, state or political society is it
the judicial power? All the officers in the district are officers
of the United States.304
Within this framework, for the same reasons, officials of the Puerto Rican government must be “Officers of the United States.”305
The rub, of course, is the phrase “[w]ithin this framework,” and it
is here that Professors Lawson and Sloane part company. What generates the constitutional barrier to Puerto Rico’s present de facto status,
as described in the preceding section, is a particular form of originalism,306 which adopts a formalistic view of both the Appointments
Clause and the Territories Clause.307 Professor Sloane does not share
this view,308 particularly relative to the latter. Many—and perhaps
most—constitutional theorists see the Constitution as an organic, constitutive instrument that necessarily evolves and derives its contemporary meaning from, beyond text and structure, historical developments
303 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
304 United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 159, 168–69 (1805).
305 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
306 See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const.
Comment. 47 (2006) (offering a concise statement of this interpretive theory and method).
307 Federal law has a long history of rejecting formalist arguments in territorial contexts—most notably with respect to the seeming requirements of Article III—so ample
precedent could be marshaled for treating territorial officials as beyond the reach of the
Appointments Clause. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 132–34, 139–87.
308 Professor Sloane finds the arguments in favor of the variant of originalism embraced by his coauthor normatively unpersuasive for substantially the reasons set forth in
Michael C. Dorf, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation and Normative
Theory, 85 Geo. L.J. 1857, 1857–62 (1997) (responding to Lawson, supra note 290). He
declines to offer or embrace any particular constitutional theory except to say that he
doubts that there exist any non-normative “ultimate ‘rules’” of constitutional interpretation. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation
73 (1997).
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subsequent to the framing, precedent, and the political or moral principles that arguably inform its text. One might also give some weight to
the changing status and needs of a powerful State at the dawn of the
twenty-first century, at a moment when it occupies a very different
global position in a very different international legal order than did the
original thirteen colonies after the American War of Independence.
Evolving practice, at home and abroad, also may constitute a valid
source of constitutional meaning.309 Early in our constitutional history,
Chief Justice Marshall echoed these views when he wrote, albeit in a
distinct context:
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure
for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means
by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of
the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It
would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable
rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been
seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.310
Now, the predominant constitutional view—as expressed, in the
context of Puerto Rico, by former U.S. Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh in Senate testimony nearly two decades ago—is that the
“Constitution knows only the mutually exclusive categories of ‘State’
and ‘Territory.’”311 That may well be correct on an originalist view. It
describes the entities recognized by the international law of the lateeighteenth century. At that time, either territory belonged to a state,
meaning one of a handful of European polities, or it was, legally, terra
nullius, “the land of no one,”312 notwithstanding that human beings inhabited many lands so characterized, including Puerto Rico. Territories
deemed terra nullius could be “discovered”313 by a state, conferring inchoate title, and that inchoate title could thereafter be perfected by
309 Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (Eighth Amendment context).
310 See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819).
311 Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 89–90.
312 Black’s Law Dictionary 1512 (8th ed. 2004).
313 The late novelist Kurt Vonnegut made this point with characteristic irony: “The
teachers told the children that [1492] was when their continent was discovered by human
beings. Actually, millions of human beings were already living full and imaginative lives on
the continent in 1492. That was simply the year in which sea pirates began to cheat and
rob and kill them.” Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Breakfast of Champions 10 (1973).
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effectivités, meaning public displays of effective control and power—or,
as the ICJ put it, “the conduct of the administrative authorities as proof
of the effective exercise of territorial jurisdiction in the region.”314
But neither the law on territorial acquisition and governance nor
the nature and diversity of political entities, has remained static since
the late-eighteenth century. Nor has constitutional law, at least as a descriptive matter. Professor Sloane believes that it would be, at a minimum, advisable to “consider what this country has become in deciding
what” the Constitution authorizes,315 particularly relative to novel international developments that were neither known nor foreseen by the
framing generation. An international legal world with only a handful of
States and territories bears little resemblance to the contemporary international landscape, populated by States, international institutions,
associated states along a broad spectrum, and a host of sui generis entities, such as Taiwan, The Holy See, the Transdniester Moldovan Republic, and so forth. Furthermore, from the perspective of U.S. law and
practice, the binary division between states and territories neither recognizes nor accommodates the broad variety of associated state relationships into which the United States has, in fact, entered—principally
with the freely associated states that comprise the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.316
If evolving practice constitutes a viable source of constitutional
meaning, then the Territories Clause and the concept of “Officers of
the United States” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause may
and perhaps should evolve to accommodate that practice. Although
Attorney General Thornburgh’s view enjoys broad acceptance today, it
is not gospel, either in the legal academy or in the Department of Justice.317 Scholars, notably T. Alexander Aleinikoff, have argued that the
Constitution indeed allows the United States to enter into a binding
compact with Puerto Rico of the kind represented to the United Nations in 1953.318 And during three previous administrations (Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Ford), U.S. officials in the Department of Justice

314 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 586 (Dec. 22).
315 See Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
316 See Keitner & Reisman, supra note 84, at 38, 51.
317 See Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 89–90.
318 See id. at 89–94 (questioning Attorney General Thornburgh’s reasoning and arguing for the need to move beyond hierarchical nineteenth-century notions of sovereignty
based on plenary federal power); see also Trías Monge, supra note 225, at 235.
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and elsewhere concluded “that Congress had the power to enter into
an irrevocable compact.”319
We present this range of views not to resolve questions of constitutional theory in general, or even the proper construction of the Territories and Appointments Clauses to Puerto Rico in particular. Rather,
we think it is possible to transcend these debates and reach solutions
that should be acceptable to persons with a range of constitutional
views and methodologies. For although we disagree on whether the
Appointments Clause poses an insuperable obstacle to formal institutions of self-governance in Puerto Rico, and relatedly on whether
Puerto Rico remains constitutionally subject to the plenary power of
Congress under the Territories Clause, we agree that, regardless of constitutional theory, mechanisms can be established that elide the constitutional issues and substantively resolve them from a practical perspective. The existence of the debate highlights the significant problems
posed by the United States’ relationship with Puerto Rico and the need
for creative solutions.
Again, from the perspective of international law, it is ordinarily a
matter of indifference how the United States chooses to comply with its
international obligations.320 If it implements them through political
rather than strictly legal means, that arrangement, so long as it produces the appropriate outputs, is of no concern to international law.
Consequently, were the President and the Senate simply to give pro
forma appointments to the elected territorial officials in Puerto Rico,
both strict constitutional formalism and international law would be satisfied. On the one hand, the people of Puerto Rico would effectively
select their own government; on the other, the literal requirements of
the Constitution’s text would be formally observed.
This proposal, of course, risks the possibility that a future President
and Senate will defy the choices of the Puerto Rican people as expressed in their local elections. But if Puerto Rico remains a U.S. territory subject to plenary congressional power at any rate, there is equally
always the risk that Congress will decide to intrude aggressively into the
local affairs of the island in disregard of the political commitments it
made in the past—or, indeed, even abolish the institutions of local selfgovernment altogether and reestablish a colonial regime. Were that to
319 See Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 89, 251 n.94 (citing Letter from A. Mitchell
McConnell, Jr., Acting Ass’t Att’y Gen. for Leg. Affairs, to Marlow W. Cook, Co-Chairman,
Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Puerto Rico, May 12, 1975); see also Trías Monge, supra note
152, at 126–31, 209 nn.16–17.
320 See 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 191, § 21 at 82–83.
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occur, it would place the United States in clear violation of its international legal obligations. At a minimum, the United States would be
obliged to resume periodic reports on Puerto Rico to the SecretaryGeneral under Article 73(e).321 At that time, the Trusteeship Council
would almost certainly resume its operations, and the United Nations,
the Organization of American States, other regional and international
institutions, and foreign states worldwide would swiftly condemn the
United States—with reputational and other international consequences
that we doubt the United States wishes to incur. But the United States
would have the raw domestic power to do it.322
There is no reason, however, to anticipate that the United States
would take these or comparable steps—and strong reasons to think that
it would not. The United States has consistently been solicitous of the
Puerto Rican people and supportive of their aspirations of self-government.323 We see no reason to anticipate unlikely events before they
happen or to strive, without relevant facts, to resolve problems that do
not yet exist. Nor is there any apparent downside to the proposal to
implement “shadow” appointments and thereby to confer unquestionably valid constitutional authority on the elected officials of Puerto
Rico.324 The tension, if genuine, between constitutional and international legal requirements can, it seems, be mediated with a very modest
amount of creativity and political will.
B. Enfranchisement: Problems and Prospects
Of course, the solution proposed in the preceding section will not
comprehensively resolve every theoretical or practical problem with the
current legal relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.
In particular and most significantly, it does not give Puerto Ricans a
voice in the selection of the federal government, which becomes even
more critical if, as Professor Lawson believes, Puerto Rico presently re321 See U.N. Charter art. 73.
322 See Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 235
(2d ed. 1996) (“In principle, every nation-state has the power—I do not say the right—to
violate international law and obligation and to suffer the consequences.”) (footnotes omitted).
323 See Report by the President’s Task Force on Puerto Rico’s Status, supra note
109, at 10–11 (reiterating the 2005 Task Force Report’s recommendation that Congress
should provide for a plebiscite to determine and implement the wishes of the Puerto Rican people to the extent consistent with the Constitution); Trías Monge, supra note 225, at
233 (noting that “the United States has been most generous toward Puerto Rico and has
clearly harbored nothing but good will toward its people”).
324 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 94, at 138.
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mains subject to the plenary control of the United States as a matter of
domestic law. Indeed, because Article II of the Constitution specifies
that the president shall be elected by state electors, it seems difficult,
and perhaps impossible, to craft a mechanism to give Puerto Ricans the
right to vote for the President in the absence of a constitutional
amendment.325 The First Circuit recently issued a strongly worded en
banc opinion to this effect.326 Equally, it seems evident, even to proponents of the compact theory and to those, like Professor Sloane, inclined toward a less formalistic reading of the Territories Clause, that
Congress may not “give territories representation in the Senate.”327
Yet if the figurative terms of the bilateral compact with Puerto Rico
do not, as we have suggested, in fact demand Puerto Rican participation in or full democratic voting rights relative to the federal government, why should effective representation be necessary at all, either
domestically or internationally? After all, as explained earlier, the people of Puerto Rico explicitly declined the opportunity to participate in
the federal government based on defined and clearly constitutional
terms as part of the de facto bargain that culminated in their associated
statehood. At least at the time, they deemed that to be the option that
best served their socioeconomic, cultural, and political interests.328
The simple answer is that the United States has since ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 25 of
which provides:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:

325 Cf. U.S. Const. amend. XXIII (giving residents of the District of Columbia the
right to vote in presidential elections).
326 Igartúa-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 147–48 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc)
(“That the franchise for choosing electors is confined to ‘states’ cannot be ‘unconstitutional’ because it is what the Constitution itself provides. . . . The path to changing the
Constitution lies not through the courts but through the constitutional amending process
. . . .”); see also Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 122–24 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “the
process set out in Article II for the appointment of electors is limited to ‘States’ and does
not include territories,” and therefore “the absence of presidential and vice-presidential
voting rights for U.S. citizens living in U.S. territories does not violate the Constitution”);
cf. Attorney Gen. of the Territory of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017, 1019 (9th Cir.
1984) (finding that U.S. citizens residing in Guam do not have the right to vote in presidential elections and that “[a] constitutional amendment would be required” to permit
them to vote).
327 Aleinikoff, supra note 18, at 90.
328 See supra notes 227–229 and accompanying text.
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(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the
will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.329
Because a statute, and perhaps the Constitution itself, makes Puerto
Ricans U.S. citizens,330 the ICCPR imposes at least an international obligation on the United States to comply with Article 25. Of course, the
United States ratified this treaty subject to a host of substantial reservations,331 including a declaration purporting to render Articles 1
through 27 “not self-executing.”332 But whatever the correct view of the
perplexing doctrine of non-self-execution, no one contends that it vitiates the international obligation itself.333 Consequently, we now consider a second tension between international and constitutional law,
one generated by a multilateral treaty that superimposes new, and dis329 See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25 (emphasis added). The issue merits analysis in its
own right, but we assume for purposes of the following analysis that the qualifier “without
unreasonable restrictions” does not vitiate the prima facie U.S. obligation to extend the
franchise in some respect to Puerto Rican citizens of the United States. See id.
330 Jones Act, Pub. L. No. 368, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951 (1917). See generally Perez, supra
note 281 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment confers citizenship by birth on Puerto
Ricans born in Puerto Rico).
331 Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, U.S. Sen. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Several of these
may be invalid as a matter of international law based on, among other things, their incompatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. See Human Rights Comm., General
Comment No. 24, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Apr. 11, 1994); Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1952 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 179,
art. 19(c) (providing that a State may formulate a reservation to a treaty unless, among
other things, it “is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”).
332 U.S. Sen. Exec. Rep. 102-23, supra note 331. Professor Sloane shares the constitutional doubts of those writers who question the comparatively novel practice whereby the
President and the Senate unilaterally declare certain manifestly not non-self-executing
provisions (in the sense of Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)) to be non-selfexecuting. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 341, 346–47 (1995); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The
Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695, 708 n.61 (1995).
333 Professor Lawson holds open the possibility that the ICCPR itself is unconstitutional because it may not carry into execution any federal power beyond the treaty power.
This possibility, however, rests on a decidedly idiosyncratic view of the scope of the treaty
power, which will be withheld for present purposes. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1.
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tinctly modern, human rights obligations on the United States relative
to the people of Puerto Rico.
At the outset, it is worth reiterating that, at least judged by the
number of provisions devoted to the subject, the selection of officials of
the United States government is the single most important topic addressed by the Constitution.334 And throughout, the Constitution
makes it quite clear that territorial inhabitants receive no direct voice in
that selection process. The House “shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”335 The Senate, although originally chosen by state legislatures,336 since the 1913
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment “shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof . . . .”337 The President is selected by the electoral college pursuant to the terms of the
Twelfth Amendment.338 Under the Twenty-third Amendment, the District of Columbia “shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may
direct . . . [a] number of electors . . . equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would
be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State . . . .”339 With respect to the rest of the electoral college,
“[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”340
All of these provisions, except for the amendment that partially
enfranchised the residents of the District of Columbia, empower the
voters or legislatures of the several states to select Congress and the
President. Territorial residents have no role in the process—though, as
noted earlier, political parties may give them a voice in selecting candidates. If the ICCPR truly imposes on the United States an obligation to
allow Puerto Rican citizens to participate meaningfully in federal elections, the Constitution seems to make compliance with that obligation
impossible absent a constitutional amendment akin to the Twenty-third
Amendment.341
334 See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
335 U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
336 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
337 Id. amend. XVII (emphasis added).
338 Id. amend. XII.
339 Id. amend. XXIII, § 1.
340 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
341 See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25.
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As with the Appointments Clause, the authors do not necessarily
agree on the constitutionality of formal solutions to this conundrum.
But also as with the Appointments Clause, we think that that there may
be practical, political solutions that circumvent these difficult legal
questions. In this case, however, the practical solutions strike both of us
as so complex that a constitutional amendment may well be far simpler
to implement.
In 2001 in Romeu v. Cohen, Judge Pierre Leval of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested a formal solution of sorts that
has regrettably received scant attention.342 The plaintiff, Romeu, was a
U.S. citizen who had previously voted in federal elections in New York
but moved to Puerto Rico in 1999.343 Under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (“UOCAVA”),344 if Romeu had moved
outside the United States, he would have been entitled by federal law to
vote by absentee ballot in New York, provided he met the procedural
requirements of the statute.345 The statute, however, considers Puerto
Rico part of the United States and therefore does not entitle former
state residents who move to Puerto Rico or other territories to require
their former states of residence to accept their absentee votes.346
Romeu challenged this exclusion of territorial citizens on a range of
constitutional grounds, alleging, among other things, violations of
equal protection, privileges or immunities, and the right to travel.347 All
of his claims were rejected by a unanimous panel of the Second Circuit.348
Judge Leval, however, who authored the court’s opinion, added
some observations “for himself alone” to suggest how Congress might
cure Romeu’s grievance and, by extension, enfranchise Puerto Rican
citizens, at least relative to presidential elections.349 Judge Leval observed that despite Article II, Section 1, as a matter of precedent, “it has
long been clear that State legislatures do not have unfettered authority
over the appointment of electors.”350 In particular, under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, among others, Congress has enacted, and the Supreme Court has sustained, voting rights legislation
342 See 265 F.3d at 127–30 (Leval, J., writing separately).
343 Id. at 120 (opinion of the Court).
344 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1 to -6 (2006).
345 See Romeu, 265 F.3d at 120–21.
346 Id. at 121.
347 Id. at 120.
348 Id.
349 Id. at 127–30 (Leval, J., writing separately).
350 Id. at 128 (Leval, J., writing separately).
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intended, for example, to prohibit processes of appointing electors that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause or enable others forms of
discrimination, as well as to ban durational residency requirements.351
After canvassing the relevant precedents, including the UOCAVA, he
concluded:
If, notwithstanding the command of Article II, section 1 that
electors be appointed in the manner that the State legislature
directs, Congress may nonetheless impose on the States a requirement that each accept the votes of certain U.S. citizens
who are not residents of the State but reside outside the
United States or in other States, I can see no reason why Congress might not also with respect to the presidential election
require the State to accept the presidential votes of certain
U.S. citizens who are nonresidents of the State residing in the
U.S. territories.352
Professor Sloane would add that federal compulsion should not be
necessary. The Supremacy Clause makes treaties “the supreme Law of
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”353 State laws directing the manner of appointing presidential electors fall within the latter category and presumably must therefore be adjusted to comply with the ICCPR.354
Former Chief Judge John Walker concurred in Romeu but wrote
separately to take issue with Judge Leval’s suggestions for granting territorial citizens federal voting rights by statute.355 In his view, Congress
has no power to impose such a requirement on the states in derogation
of their prerogative under Article II absent a constitutional violation
that may be remedied pursuant to one of Congress’s enumerated enforcement powers under the various amendments protecting voting
rights.356 Because the court unanimously agreed that denial of Romeu’s
alleged right to vote by absentee ballot did not violate any of these
amendments, Congress had no violation to remedy.357 Again, however,
351 See Romeu, 265 F.3d at 128–29.
352 See id. at 129.
353 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
354 Cf. Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 Am. J.
Int’l L. 679, 683 (1998) (“It apparently needs reminding, even after two hundred years,
that treaties of the United States are supreme law of the land, and are binding on the
states by express provision in the U.S. Constitution.”).
355 See Romeu, 265 F.3d at 131–36 (Walker, C.J., concurring).
356 Id. at 131–36.
357 Id.
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it is unclear, in Professor Sloane’s view, why the obligation to adjust the
manner of appointing presidential electors does not devolve upon the
states directly by virtue of the Supremacy Clause—or, alternatively, why
Congress could not pass a statute of the sort envisioned by Judge Leval
in order to implement the ICCPR and ensure that the United States
meets its treaty obligations, which that Clause makes “the supreme Law
of the Land.”358
In view of the precedents, there is much to commend Judge
Leval’s proposal. In 1970 in Oregon v. Mitchell,359 for example, an 8–1
majority of the Supreme Court, albeit on a splintered variety of rationales, upheld Congress’s constitutional power to override state residency
requirements and force states to accept absentee ballots in presidential
elections.360 The UOCAVA, as Judge Leval pointed out, similarly overrides state law to compel states to accept overseas absentee votes that
they might otherwise reject.361 Assuming that Mitchell reached the correct result, it is unclear why Congress would be unable to do the same
for territorial inhabitants.
From an originalist perspective, however, there is much to commend Judge Walker’s objections. Judge Walker examines all plausible—
and, in Professor Lawson’s judgment, several implausible—sources of
enumerated congressional authority to implement Judge Leval’s proposal and finds all of them wanting.362 Especially in the context of
presidential electors, the Constitution is quite clear that it commits the
selection process to state legislatures, subject only to external constitutional constraints (and congressional enforcement authority pursuant
to those constraints).363 There is no enumerated power that colorably
gives Congress power to tell states how they must choose electors.
Professor Lawson, unsurprisingly, comes down on the side of Judge
Walker. As does Judge Walker, Professor Lawson gravely doubts the
358 See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
359 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
360 See id. at 269–70 (Black, J.) (grounding the power to override residency requirements in Congress’s generalized power to create and maintain a national government); id.
at 147–49 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (grounding the power in
Congress’s enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the right to vote); id. at 237–40 (Brennan, J., White, J., and Marshall, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (grounding the power in Congress’s enforcement authority
under Section 5 to protect the right to travel); id. at 285–87 (Stewart, J., Burger, C.J., and
Blackmun, J., concurring part and dissenting in part) (also relying principally on enforcement of the right to travel).
361 Romeu, 265 F.3d at 129 (Leval, J., writing separately).
362 See id. at 131–36 (Walker, C.J., concurring).
363 See id. at 134.
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constitutionality of the UOCAVA.364 He is also quite sure that, from an
originalist standpoint, Oregon v. Mitchell was wrongly decided—and not
just because he agrees with Justice Harlan that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment does not address voting rights. None of the sources
of congressional power identified by the various Justices in Mitchell is
impressive to an originalist. Enforcement of the right to travel, the rationale on which six Justices relied, is even more problematic than enforcement of the right to vote, because the Constitution does not contain an explicit right to travel. The Constitution protects aspects of interstate travel through a variety of provisions, including the Privileges
and Immunities Clause,365 the Commerce Clause,366 and the Privileges
or Immunities Clause,367 but there is no generalized right to travel for
Congress to enforce. Nor is there, as Justice Black maintained, a congressional power “to create and maintain a national government.”368
There are specific powers granted to specific institutions, including
Congress, that collectively serve the end of creating and maintaining a
national government, but there is no “create and maintain” clause that
stands independently of its constituent parts.369 Professor Lawson believes the Constitution commits the selection process for presidential
electors to the states and that is the end of the matter.
Professor Sloane, in contrast, finds Judge Leval’s proposal creative
and intuitively appealing.370 He would not be so quick either to dispense with long-settled precedent or to take a narrow view of the many
congressional powers that might bear on this issue. Rather than engage
in yet another constitutional debate, however, we once again want to
consider whether international legal obligations towards Puerto Rican
residents might be met by circumventing rather than confronting the
possible constitutional problems with territorial voting rights. As with
the Appointments Clause issue, we agree that such solutions exist in
principle. But unlike the previous issue, which could be solved with
relative ease by the political departments and with no serious political

364 See id. at 134 n.7.
365 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
366 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
367 Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
368 See Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 269.
369 For similar reasons, Professor Lawson would also consign to the constitutional junkheap Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), which upheld congressional power to
regulate contributions in presidential elections on much the same reasoning employed by
Justice Black in Mitchell. See id. at 545.
370 See Romeu, 265 F.3d at 127–30 (Leval, J., writing separately).
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cost, any solution to the voting rights problem will, we think, be rife
with practical and political difficulties.
Territorial citizens of Puerto Rico could be given effective voting
rights through the same kind of “shadow” mechanisms that we have
already discussed.371 Congress could authorize, for example, the local
election of a number of persons in the various territories equal to the
number of representatives in Congress to which they would be entitled
if they were states. It could then allow those elected officials to participate, in a substantive but formally nonbinding fashion, in congressional
deliberations and votes. And Congress could then cast and count its
formal votes in a fashion that conforms to the outcomes that would
have resulted if the votes of the territorial representatives had official
weight. Congress could even inscribe these procedures in House and
Senate rules, though such rules could be repealed by a majority at any
time and therefore would not add value to the mix.
Such a procedure would, as far as we can tell, comply at least in
part with U.S. obligations under the ICCPR.372 But there is, needless to
say, no chance whatsoever that anything like this will happen in the
foreseeable future. Such a mechanism would likely dilute the power of
existing members of Congress and change the political dynamics of
that institution. Our point is only that such a mechanism could be implemented without a constitutional amendment. That is, Congress
could do it unilaterally, without the consent of the states. With respect
to presidential elections, however, matters are even more complicated.
The states could, if they wished, implement any of Judge Leval’s proposals, either informally or through a compact.373 But trying to secure
that kind of agreement on a proposal that could easily have the effect
of overriding the results of a state’s election is beyond quixotic. Our
point, once again, is only that, given some creative thought, mechanisms exist that could conceivably satisfy U.S. international obligations
without the need for constitutional amendments.
Conclusion
We conclude by noting an option that offers perhaps the simplest
solution to the diverse issues explored in this Article: Puerto Rico
could, as is its international right as an associated state, declare its independence and become a fully sovereign State. The United States and
371 See supra notes 320–324 and accompanying text.
372 See ICCPR, supra note 16, art. 25.
373 See supra notes 349–352 and accompanying text.

2009]

Associated Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered

71

Puerto Rico could then enter into an Article II treaty whereby Puerto
Rico delegated certain sovereign competences to the United States.
This would effectively establish an arrangement virtually identical to
that brought into effect, as a practical matter, by the figurative bilateral
compact of 1952. But it would be subject to far fewer constitutional difficulties. Of course, this presupposes political will on both sides, and
that may be an unwarranted assumption. Furthermore, a treaty could
not resolve the enfranchisement issue. But it is not at all clear that this
would even remain an issue were two sovereign States to enter into an
associate-principal relationship by treaty—for such a treaty could, for
example, simply delimit the scope of federal laws to which Puerto Rico
agreed to be subject, obviating the need for an effective voice in the
(now no longer plenary) power of the United States over Puerto Rico.
We do not expect the solutions canvassed in this Article to be
adopted in the near future, and its point has not been a vain hope to
spur such immediate action. Our goal is more modest: to bring these
issues into the mainstream of both international and constitutional legal dialogue in the United States. For whatever one’s view of the status
quo, it should be clear by now that serious arguments exist suggesting
that the current arrangement between the United States and Puerto
Rico may violate the Constitution, U.S. obligations under general international law, treaties to which the United States is a party—or all of
the above. The practical consequences for the people of Puerto Rico
have long been decried and documented in detail elsewhere. The situation, in our view, compels far more attention than it has received to
date.

